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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (49) Autor Alberini, Anna (8) Boyd, James (6) Mondello, Gerard (3) Scasny, Milan (3) Tonin, Stefania (3) Austin, David H. (2) Carson, Richard T. (2) Caswell, Julie A. (2) Charlier, Christophe (2) Dubois, Pierre (2) Guignet, Dennis (2) Hanemann, W. Michael (2) Henson, Spencer J. (2) Hirschauer, Norbert (2) Kopp, Raymond J. (2) Krosnick, Jon A. (2) Krupnick, Alan J. (2) Mitchell, Robert C. (2) Nitsch, Heike (2) Osterburg, Bernhard (2) Mais... Palavra-chave K32 (49) Environmental Economics and Policy (18) Q28 (13) I18 (10) L51 (8) Q18 (8) Q58 (8) Agricultural and Food Policy (6) Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (6) Health Economics and Policy (5) J17 (5) Q01 (5) Q51 (5) Contaminated Sites (4) Environment (4) Financial responsibility (4) Food safety (4) K0 (4) Liability (4) Natural resource damages (4) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (30) Conference Paper or Presentation (13) Journal Article (4) Report (1) Working Paper (1) Ano 2012 (1) 2011 (3) 2010 (7) 2009 (3) 2008 (4) 2007 (1) 2006 (5) 2005 (8) 2004 (3) 2003 (1) 2001 (3) 1999 (2) 1998 (2) 1997 (1) 1996 (3) 1995 (2) Mais... País United States (49) Idioma Inglês (46) Alemão (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 49 Primeira ... 1 2 3 ... Última Banking on "Green Money": Are Environmental Financial Responsibility Rules Fulfilling Their Promise? AgEcon Boyd, James. Financial responsibility rules are an increasingly common form of environmental regulation. Currently, the operators of landfills, underground petroleum storage tanks, offshore rigs, and oil tankers must demonstrate the existence of adequate levels of capital as a precondition to the legal operation of their businesses. Environmental financial responsibility ensures that firms possess the resources to compensate society for pollution costs created in the course of business operations. In addition to providing a source of funds for victim compensation and pollution remediation, financial responsibility is thought to motivate better decision-making, particularly regarding the management of long-term risks. This article describes both the promise of financial... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial responsibility; Environmental liability; Waste disposal; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; L51; K32. Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10592 New Regulations Governing Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Require New Solutions: Discussion AgEcon Fleming, Ronald A.; Thomas, Michael H.. This paper discusses the three invited papers presented in the session titled “New Regulations Require New Solutions: Federal Provisions Governing Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations” (i.e., CAFOs). These papers provide an excellent review of current state and federal laws and an excellent summary of what has been and is currently being done with respect to CAFO regulation. The papers present three different policy approaches: i) alternative performance standards, ii) location-specific regulation, and iii) insurance-based underwriting of CAFO discharges. Each approach has its drawbacks; however, blending theses suggested policies into current regulations would result in efficiency gains. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Alternative performance standards; Animal Feeding Operations; Confined Animal Feeding Operations; Environmental quality; Insurance; Livestock; Manure management; Market-based incentives; Regulation; Spatial regulation; D81; K32; Q52; Q55; Q58. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43349 Context and the VSL: Evidence from a Stated Preference Study in Italy and the Czech Republic AgEcon Alberini, Anna; Scasny, Milan. We report on the results of a survey based on conjoint choice experiments that was specifically designed to investigate the effect of context on the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), an important input into the calculation of the mortality benefits of environmental policies that reduce premature mortality. We define “context” broadly to include i) the cause of death (respiratory illness, cancer, road traffic accident), ii) the beneficiary of the risk reduction (adult v. child), and iii) the mode of provision of the risk reduction (public program v. private good). The survey was conducted following similar protocols in Italy and the Czech Republic. When do not distinguish for the cause of death, child and adult VSL are not significantly different from one... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: VSL; Conjoint Choice Experiments; Mortality Risk Reductions; Cost-benefit Analysis; Forced Choice Questions; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; I18; J17; K32; Q51. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90952 Liability, Regulation and Endogenous Risk: Incidence and Severity of Escaped Prescribed Fires in the United States AgEcon Yoder, Jonathan K.. Prescribed fire is a useful but risky method for reducing general wildfire risk and improving wildlife habitat, biodiversity, timber growth, and agricultural forage. In the past the fifteen years, laws is some states have been adopted to support the use of prescribed fire. This article examines the effect of liability law and common regulations on the incidence and severity of escaped prescribed fires in the United States from 1970 to 2002. Regression results show that stringent statutory liability law and regulation tends to reduce the number and severity of escaped prescribed fires on private land, but not on federal land where state liability law does not directly apply. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Endogenous risk; Prescribed fire economics; Liability law; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; K32; Q2. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12964 Das neue Gentechnikgesetz - ein Gentechnikverhinderungsgesetz? AgEcon Becker, Alexander; Holm-Muller, Karin. In addition to existing juridical analyses of the new German act for genetic engineering, this article deals with an environmental economic assessment. It is examined what kind of external costs will arise by using/applying genetic engineering and how they will be allocated. Our focus is on the costs that explicitly evolve from the societal postulated coexistence of conventional/ organic farms and users of biotechnology. If the protection of the existing production is accepted, as postulated by politics, the new act internalizes the so called market losses relatively well. In this context, the design of precautionary duties that have to be still established by law is of utmost importance. To avoid the dangers of an excessive liability by the farmer, it is... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Act for genetic engineering; Liability; Coexistence; Market loss; Agricultural and Food Policy; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; K32; Q55. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18775 Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data AgEcon Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav. The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for estimation of the parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that allowing the principal to strategically distribute the production inputs across heterogenous agents as part of the contract design, the principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts tailored to fit agents' preferences or characteristics. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we find that contracting farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agency Contracts; Optimal Incentives; Moral Hazard; Risk Aversion; Heterogeneity; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25568 An Interdisciplinary Approach to White-collar Crime in the Food Sector AgEcon Hirschauer, Norbert; Musshoff, Oliver; Scheerer, Sebastian. The probability that buyers are deceived with regard to the quality or safety of purchased products (moral hazard) increases with the profits which suppliers can earn through opportunistic behaviour. It decreases with the probability and level of losses that result from disclosure of malpractice. It also decreases with protective factors rooted in the suppliers' social contexts - such as values, emotional bonds etc. - that shield them from yielding to economic temptations. This paper describes how a systematic analysis of economic incentives and social context factors can be provided through an interdisciplinary approach which combines the analytical powers of microeconomics (game theory) and criminology (control theories). The approach is discussed with... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Behavioural food risks; Control theories; Game theory; Moral hazard; Opportunistic malpractice; Agribusiness; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A13; K32; K42. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25688 Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise? AgEcon Boyd, James. Financal assurance rules, also known as financial responsibility or bonding requirements, foster cost internalization by requiring potential polluters to demonstrate the financial resources necessary to compensate for environmental damage that may arise in the future. Accordingly, assurance is an important complement to liability rules, restoration obligations, and other regulatory compliance requirements. The paper reviews the need for assurance, given the prevalence of abandoned environmental obligations, and assesses the implementation of assurance rules in the United States. From the standpoint of both legal effectiveness and economic efficiency, assurance rules can be improved. On the whole, however, cost recovery, deterrence, and enforcement are... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial assurance; Financial responsibility; Bonding; Environmental insurance; Environmental Economics and Policy; K13; Q38; K32. Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10809 Voluntary Pollution Abatement and Regulation AgEcon Delgado, Michael S.; Khanna, Neha. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Altruism; Voluntary Pollution Abatement; Regulation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q52; Q58; K32. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103886 Intel's XL Permit: A Framework for Evaluation AgEcon Boyd, James; Krupnick, Alan J.; Mazurek, Janice V.. The paper develops a framework to evaluate permits granted to firms under the Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL -- with emphasis on the novel air permit granted to the Intel Corporation. We describe the permit, the process that created it, and the types of costs and benefits likely to arise from this type of "facility-specific" regulatory arrangement. Among other things, the paper describes the permit's impact on environmental quality, production costs, transaction costs, and Intel's strategic market position. The paper also considers how an estimate of the costs and benefits -- both to Intel and society -- might be estimated. While facility-specific regulation typically conjures images of production cost savings as processes are re-engineered... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Project XL; Tailored regulation; Environmental regulation; Cost-benefit analysis; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; L51; Q28; L63; K32. Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10666 Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data AgEcon Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav. In this paper we develop an analytical framework for the estimation of the structural model parameters of an incentive contract under moral hazard with heterogeneous agents. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we confirm that contract farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across farmers. Assuming that contracts are optimal, we obtain estimates of a lower and an upper bound of agents' reservation utilities. We show that farmers with higher risk aversion have lower outside opportunities and hence lower reservation utilities. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Contracting; Heterogenous agents; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries; Production Economics; D82; L24; Q12; K32; L51. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24645 Welfare Measures and Mandatory Regulation for Transgenic Food in the European Union: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis AgEcon Diez, Maria Del Carmen Fernandez. This paper presents an analytical framework for studying the impact of mandatory labelling regulation for transgenic food. We compare Genetically Modified (GM) and conventional crop markets and identify gains for food processors prior to mandatory labelling and losses after this measure for the GM market. Nevertheless, food processors could obtain gains for conventional products after market disgregation. Finally, consumers will be worse off both for conventional and GM foods unless qualities other than changes to prices are considered. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Welfare; Mandatory labelling; Transgenic; Genetically modified organism; European Union policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q18; K32; D62. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24472 A Strategic Perspective on the Impact of Food Safety Standards on Developing Countries AgEcon Henson, Spencer J.; Jaffee, Steven. This paper explores the competing concepts of 'standards as barriers' and standards as catalysts' in the context of food safety standards in international trade in agricultural and food products. It is suggested that food safety standards can act as both a barrier to trade and the basis of competitive positioning for developing countries in international markets. This suggests that the application of a strategic framework to analyze and assess alternative responses to evolving food safety standards can throw some light on the circumstances under which standards act to prohibit trade or, alternatively, create competitive trade opportunities. The use of such a framework is illustrated through a brief case study of fish and fishery product exports from... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agriculture; Food; Trade; Food Safety; Standards; Technical barriers to Trade; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q18; K32; F13. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25456 The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy AgEcon Keohane, Nathaniel O.; Revesz, Richard L.; Stavins, Robert N.. In the realm of environmental policy instrument choice, there is great divergence between the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality. Four gaps stand out. First, despite the advantages of market-based policy instruments, they have been used to a minor degree, compared with conventional, command-and-control instruments. Second, pollution-control standards have typically been much more stringent for new than for existing sources, despite the inefficiency of this approach. Third, in the few instances in which market-based instruments have been adopted, they have nearly always taken the form of grandfathered tradeable permits, rather than auctioned permits or pollution taxes, despite the advantages in some situations of... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; H11; P16; K32; Q28. Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10759 Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety AgEcon Mondello, Gerard. This paper studies the delegation of activities that pose serious risks to health and the environment in an economy regulated by strict liability schemes. Strict liability induces judgment-proof possibilities. Two civil liability regimes are then compared: a strict liability scheme and a capped strict liability one. The argument is led under a twofold asymmetric information assumption between the principal and the agent: the efficiency level in effort for safety and the agent’s level of wealth. The paper shows that standard strict liability under information asymmetries deters the efficient agent to compete and favors adverse selection. Then, under conditions, a capped strict liability regime is a better regime than a standard strict liability one because... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Health Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94621 ASYMMETRY IN RAW MILK SAFETY PERCEPTIONS AND INFORMATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK IN FRESH PRODUCE MARKETING AND POLICY AgEcon Knutson, Ronald D.; Currier, Russell W.; Ribera, Luis A.; Goeringer, L. Paul. Scientific evidence clearly indicates that consumption of raw milk carries substantial disease-inducing health risks. While federal U.S. policy mandates that milk moving in interstate commerce be pasteurized; within 41 of 50 states, raw milk can be obtained for consumption. Warning labels notwithstanding, a segment of U.S. consumers pays higher prices for higher-risk raw milk than for either organic or conventional milk. The behavioral factors leading to raw milk consumption are explored. The paternalistic regulatory options for reducing the risk associated with drinking raw milk are identified. Implications for fresh produce sold directly from farms to consumers or through farmers markets are drawn. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Raw milk; Pasteurization; Health risks; Behavioral economics; Bounded rationality; Paternalistic regulations; Public health; HACCP; GLOBALG.A.P.; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Demand and Price Analysis; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Food Security and Poverty; Health Economics and Policy; A12; A13; A14; D11; D18; D46; D71; D78; D82; I18; K23; K32; Q11; Q18. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116440 Hazardous Activities and Civil Strict Liability: The Regulator’s Dilemma AgEcon Mondello, Gerard. This paper addresses the conditions for setting up strict civil liability schemes. For that it compares the social efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: the strict liability regime and the “capped strict liability scheme”. First, it shows that the regulator faces an effective dilemma when he has to enforce one of these schemes. This because the social cost of a severe harm (and the associated optimum care effort) is determined independently of any liability regime. This independency has economic consequences. First, victims and polluters pit one against another about the liability regime that the government should enforce. Hence, financially constrained polluters prefer the ceiling of responsibilities... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environment; Strict Liability; Ex-Ante Regulation; Ex-Post Liability; Judgment-Proof; Environment Law; CERCLA; Environmental Liability; Environmental Economics and Policy; K0; K32; Q01; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101299 Global Compensation for Oil Pollution Damages: The Innovations of The American Oil Pollution Act AgEcon Boyd, James. Via technology and operations standards, U.S. regulation exerts an important influence over worldwide marine safety standards. But in addition, several other aspects of U.S. law deserve wider international consideration and adoption. First, the Oil Pollution Act's natural resource damage provisions are an innovative and effective way to deter marine pollution and provide for the restoration of injured ecological resources. Second, the relatively strict financial requirements imposed on marine transporters help ensure that polluters, rather than the public, pay if damage is caused. Liability and financial responsibility rules are not unknown in other countries. But the United States has a longer history with implementation and applies its rules more... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Oil Pollution Act; Natural resource damages; Environmental liability; Financial assurance; Financial responsibility; Valuation; Farm Management; K13; K32; Q38. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10691 Accidents Waiting to Happen: Liability Policy and Toxic Pollution Releases AgEcon Alberini, Anna; Austin, David H.. Proponents of environmental policies based on liability assert that strict liability imposed on the polluter will induce firms to handle hazardous wastes properly and to avoid disposing them into the environment. Economic theory and a few well-publicized cases, however, suggest that a number of factors may dilute the incentives posed by strict liability. In this paper, we run regressions relating unintended releases of pollution into the environment (aggregated at the state level, and followed over nine years from 1987 to 1995) to the imposition of strict liability on the polluter, exploiting variation across states in the liability provisions of their mini-Superfund laws, and in the years these were adopted. We experiment with instrumental variable... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Strict liability; Toxic spills; Policy endogeneity; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; C33; K32. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10450 Rates of Time Preferences for Saving Lives in the Hazardous Waste Site Context AgEcon Alberini, Anna; Tonin, Stefania; Turvani, Margherita. Replaced with revised version of paper 02/20/09. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Value of a Statistical Life; Latent Risk Reductions; Individual Discount Rates; Rate of Time Preference for Saving Lives; Contaminated Sites; Remediation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; J17; I18; K32; Q51; Q53. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/47177 Registros recuperados: 49 Primeira ... 1 2 3 ... Última

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