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| Registros recuperados: 51 | |
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| Raynaud, Emmanuel; Sauvee, Loic; Valceschini, Egizio. |
| For many agricultural products, the quality of the final products strongly depends on different stages of the productive chain. This stresses the importance of relationships between quality signal owners and suppliers in the vertical chain. Based on a New Institutional Economics analysis, the goal of this paper is twofold: (i) to design a framework to study the links between quality signaling, coordination in the supply chains and the institutional environment, (ii) to conduct a comparative analysis to identify, compare and explain the modes of organization implemented for the governance of different quality signs. The general hypothesis is that, in order to assure the credibility of a quality signal, there must be an efficient alignment between quality... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Alignment; Credibility; Governance structures; Quality signals; Agribusiness; L14; L15; L22. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24917 |
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| Walls, Margaret. |
| Solid waste management services are contracted out to private firms in many U.S. communities. Household waste collection, transport, and disposal are relatively straightforward services to define within the terms of a contract. The addition of recycling, however, significantly complicates matters. How should contracts be structured to provide incentives for recycling? Who should own key facilities, such as recyclable materials processing facilities? Should a separate contract for processing and sale of materials be used, or should these services be provided by government employees or purely private markets? These questions are addressed in this study using the principal-agent framework and the theory of incomplete contracts in economics. I explain stylized... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Incentive contracts; Asset specificity; Principal-agent models; Waste collection; Recycling; Environmental Economics and Policy; L33; L14; Q2. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10707 |
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| McLaren, John. |
| This paper provides an economic theory of the degree of formality in industrial procurement. The argument is based on a tension between two procurement goals: imposing cost discipline on the supplier, and creating the conditions for cooperative innovation. In this model, a contract can solve the cost discipline problem, but only by discouraging cooperation; a less formal arrangement provides cooperation but poor discipline. The attractiveness of contracts is smaller, the less vertically integrated the industry, because a thick market for inputs provides its own discipline incentives even without a contract. Thus, in highly integrated industries, contracts are used, while in less integrated industries business is done on handshakes. This theory of the role... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Japan-US comparisons; Subcontracting; Cooperative innovation; Industrial Organization; L14; L22. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28407 |
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| Bignebat, Celine; Koc, A. Ali; Lemeilleur, Sylvaine. |
| A wide range of the empirical studies shows to what extend the rise of supermarkets in developing countries deeply transform domestic marketing channels. In particular, the exclusion of small producers from the so-called dynamic marketing channels (that is remunerative ones) is at stake. Based on original data collected in Turkey in 2007 at the producer and the wholesale market levels, we show that the intermediaries are decisive in order to understand the impact of downstream restructuring (supermarkets) on upstream decisions (producers). The results show first that producers are not aware of the final buyer of their produce, as intermediaries hinder the visibility of the marketing channel, their choice is restricted to that of the first intermediary.... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Supermarkets; Small farmers; Fresh fruit and vegetables; Turkey; Agribusiness; Production Economics; Q13; L14; D24. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52856 |
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| Freire Junior, Weimar da Rocha; Carvalheiro, Elizangela Mara; Staduto, Jefferson Andronio Ramundo; Opazo, Miguel Angel Uribe. |
| This study, in the light of transaction cost theory, has assessed the contractual relationships, eliciting the contracts in the Brazilian agribusiness. By using the transaction attributes in their main vectors of the features in which give the possibility to design the government structure of the lower cost. The contracts present a government structure, which when they are widely considered to represent a variety of agreement among the economic agents. On this system, the analysis to be developed is going to adopt a statistic multivariate method, which is going to assess nine contracts mostly consonant with the agribusiness (five contracts on sales, three on franchising and one on agriculture joint venture). These relationships facilitate to emphasize... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contract; Transaction costs economy; Multivariate analysis.; Agribusiness; Q13; L14. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61246 |
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| Castriota, Stefano; Delmastro, Marco. |
| The concept of reputation has been used in every field of economic research, given its capacity to affect the outcome of all economic and financial transactions. The theoretical debate on reputation is very rich, but the mechanisms of reputation building have not been explored enough from the empirical viewpoint. In this paper we investigate the determinants of firm reputation taking into consideration the interactions between individual and collective reputation. This paper is one of the first attempts to provide robust evidence on the determinants of firm reputation using a large set of controls applied to a database not affected by self-selection bias. In fact, we constructed a new database containing the universe of wineries located in four regions of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Reputation; Credibility; Asymmetric information; Quality standards; Industrial Organization; L14; L15. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45504 |
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| Rainey, Ronald L.; Dixon, Bruce L.; Parsch, Lucas D.; Ahrendsen, Bruce L.; Bierlen, Ralph W.. |
| Landlord satisfaction levels with agricultural land-leasing agreements are examined with a 1998 sample of Arkansas landowners. Ordered probit models are estimated identifying which factors significantly affect satisfaction levels. Results indicate that the type of lease is not a significant determinant of landlord satisfaction levels. Proportion of landlord’s income from leasing, tenant educational background, social capital variables, presence of irrigation equipment, and perceptions about the FAIR Act were found to significantly affect lease satisfaction in at least one of the three satisfaction models estimated. A comparison with an earlier study of Arkansas tenants indicates landlords have generally higher satisfaction levels. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Cropland contracts; Landlord satisfaction; Leasing; Probit models; L14; Q12; Q24. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43156 |
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| Sykuta, Michael E.; Klein, Peter G.; James, Harvey S., Jr.. |
| The rise of contract farming and vertical integration is one of the most important changes in modern agriculture. Yet the adoption and diffusion of these new forms of organization has varied widely across regions, commodities, or farm types, however. Transaction cost theories and the like are not fully effective at explaining the variation of adoption rates of different organizational forms, in part because of their inherent static nature. In order to explain the adoption, diffusion and evolution of organizational form, a more dynamic framework is required. This paper lays out such a framework for understanding the evolution of organizational practices in U.S. agriculture by drawing on existing theories of economic organization, the diffusion of... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracting; Vertical integration; Organizational innovation; Diffusion; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; L14; L22; Q13; O33. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19390 |
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| Mondelli, Mario P.; Zylbersztajn, Decio. |
| What are the determinants of the commercial channel choice in the beef producers-processors transactions? The question refers to the coordination and production control problem associated to changes in consumer’s awareness of specific attributes in food products. Two contractual arrangements coexist in this transaction: direct-contracting and broker-induced transactions Transaction Cost Economic offers helpful insights to understand the reason for the development and adaptations of different contractual arrangement moved by transaction cost economizing perspective. The empirical analysis is focused in the Uruguayan beef agro-industrial system. Analysis integrates (i) institutional and organizational changes in the beef industry; (ii) based on the analysis... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Vertical Coordination; Beef System; Contractual arrangement; Transaction Cost Economics; Agribusiness; D23; L14; Q13. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61237 |
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| Albano, Gian Luigi; Cesi, Berardino. |
| When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use different strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, verifiable by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with different efficiency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same firm in future competitive... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Repeated Procurement; Handicapping; Relational Contracts; Stick and Carrot Strategy; Political Economy; C73; D82; D44; H57; K12; L14. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6370 |
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| Richter, Susan M.. |
| The economic literature has highlighted how in the absence of income insurance risk averse households may voluntarily withdraw from credit markets, since contract terms may transfer too much risk to the household (Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger, 2007). Therefore, households may forgo activities with higher expected income in favor of activities with less income variability across states of nature (Morduch, 1995). Recent literature has also evaluated how remittances provide households with insurance against income shocks (Yang and Choi, 2007; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989) and how remittances may help households bypass financial intermediaries (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001; Taylor, Rozelle, and de Brauw, 2003). There has been minimal attention, however, on how... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Financial Economics; Health Economics and Policy; F22; F24; L14; O1; 015. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6261 |
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| Registros recuperados: 51 | |
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