SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Kledal, Paul Rye.

The paper is based on research conducted for DARCOF II (Danish Research Centre for Organic Farming, www.darcof.dk). The aim of the research project is to analyze the future development of the Danish organic food sector through focusing on two agro-commodities: vegetables and pork. Emphasis is placed on identification of economic forces within the supply chains. The main conclusions of the paper - being the results from the organic vegetable chain are that the rules and regulations, and the development of alternative transaction processes in organic food and farming have so far been founded on social counter reactions to the mechanisms of a free market economy that result in the marginalization of farmers, animals welfare and the environment. However,...

Regional Integration in Developing Countries: Some Lessons Based on Case Studies

Palavras-chave: Political economy; Institutional economics; Supply chain management; Organic food & farming; Farmers' treadmill; Retail bargain power; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24218

Shams, Rasul.

The main focus of this paper is the question if the success of regional integration organisation in developing countries is, in fact, dependent on factors like similarity of their economic structure, market size or lack of commitment. It is shown that there are also other more important institutional and politico-economical reasons to explain the functioning of such organisations in developing countries. Case studies of ECOWAS and SADC will be used to discuss this question. It is also very often argued that southsouth integration is inferior to north-south integration. This will be discussed considering the case of MERCOSUR as an example.

Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions in Transition Countries of Asia and Europe

Palavras-chave: Regional integration; Economic development; Africa; Latin America; Political economy; International Relations/Trade; F15; O1; P16.

Ano: 2003

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26272

Rozelle, Scott; Swinnen, Johan F.M..

The paper analyzes the political and institutional factors which are behind the dramatic changes in distortions to agricultural incentives in the transition countries in East Asia (China and Vietnam), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, etc), the rest of the former Soviet Union, and in Central and Eastern Europe. The paper explains why these changes have occurred and why there are large differences among transition countries in the extent and the nature of the remaining distortions.

Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India

Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural distortions; Transition economies; China; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; N50; O13; O21; P22; P26.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50298

Besley, Timothy; Pande, Rohini; Rao, Vijayendra.

This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behavior while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.

Palavras-chave: Development; Political economy; Public provision of private goods; Decentralization; Political Economy; O12; H11; H42; O20.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28426

Food Protection for Sale

Lopez, Rigoberto A.; Matschke, Xenia.

This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data from U.S. food processing industries from 1978 to 1992 under alternative import demand specifications. All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and previous empirical work qualitatively. Although welfare weights are very sensitive to import demand specification, a surprising result is that we obtain weights between 2.6 and 3.6 for domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and supply functions. In contrast, results based on import slopes or elasticities from directly specified import demands (including the Armington model) yield the usual, unrealistically large estimates for the domestic welfare weight. We contend that the latter...

Agricultural Distortion Patterns Since the 1950s: What Needs Explaining?

Palavras-chave: Trade protection; Tariffs; Lobbying; Political economy; Food manufacturing; Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy; F13; F1; L66; C12.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25195

Anderson, Kym; Croser, Johanna L.; Sandri, Damiano; Valenzuela, Ernesto.

This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price-support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price...

WHO DETERMINES FARM PROGRAMS? AGRIBUSINESS AND THE MAKING OF FARM POLICY

Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural price and trade policies; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; F59; H20; N50; O13.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50305

Alston, Julian M.; Carter, Colin A.; Wohlgenant, Michael K..

Political-economic analyses of the causes and consequences of agricultural commodity policies typically emphasize farmer and consumer (taxpayer) interests and underplay the role of agribusiness. A more complete understanding of agricultural policy requires paying attention to the important role of agribusiness interests. Policies that benefit farmers (e.g., price supports, supply controls, deficiency payments) may either enhance or reduce agribusiness profits. The type of policy instrument preferred by agribusiness varies among commodities, depending on the technology of the marketing processes beyond the farm gate and the elasticity of final demand. This paper emphasizes the idea that instruments of farm policy are chosen in response to pressures from...

Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions: The Literature to Date

Palavras-chave: Farm programs; Farm policy; Agribusiness; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy.

Ano: 1989

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51252

Swinnen, Johan F.M..

The 1980s and first half of the 1990s were a very active period in the field of political economy of agricultural protection. While the past decade has witnessed a slowdown in this area, there have been very important developments on political economy in other parts of the economics profession. This paper reviews key new insights and developments in the general political economy literature and draws implications for the study of the political economy of distortions to agricultural incentives.

Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter?

Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural distortions; High-income countries; Developing countries; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; N50; O13; P16; P26.

Ano: 2009

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50308

Ando, Amy Whritenour.

This paper uses duration analysis to evaluate the ability of interest groups to influence the timing of decisions to add species to the endangered species list by exerting pressure on the Fish and Wildlife Service. Using data from 1990 to 1994, it finds that public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten (respectively) the progress of candidate species through the parts of the listing process most directly under the agency's control. Since the Service is not an atypical agency, similar patterns of public influence on delay may exist in other areas of bureaucratic decision making as well.

Economies of Scope in Endangered-Species Protection: Evidence from Interest-Group Behavior

Palavras-chave: Duration analysis; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 1999

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10564

Ando, Amy Whritenour.

This paper looks for positive spillovers from the legal protection of one species to the welfare of others, and for evidence of economies of scope in the costs associated with protecting species under the Endangered Species Act. The analyses use data on the intensity of interest-group comment activity in response to proposals to protect new species. The results suggest that these phenomena are significant, strengthening arguments that wildlife-protection policy should be shifted towards species groups or ecosystems. However, the findings are also consistent with diminishing public willingness-to-pay for protected species in a given area, a pattern which also has public-policy implications.

Economia política da disputa por terras em Minas Gerais

Palavras-chave: Economies of scope; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy.

Ano: 1999

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10903

Araujo Junior, Ari Francisco de; Shikida, Claudio; Alvarenga, Patricia Silva.

The article analyzes the determinants of the probability of dispute over land (conflicts, occupations and settlement projects) in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Through the use of a logit model, we found that the main influences are political and economical ones. Apparently, the behavior of the agrarian reform’s supporters follows the political incentive, with fewer occurrences of conflicts in towns governed by political allies. By other hand, the economical determinants - degree of poverty and the economic growth - have negative impacts on it.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Agrarian development; Political economy; Regional economics; Agribusiness; D72; D74; O43.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61236

Why are Latin Americans so unhappy about reforms?

Panizza, Ugo; Yanez, Monica.

This paper uses opinion surveys to document discontent with the pro-market reforms implemented by most Latin American countries during the 1990s. The paper also explores four possible sets of explanations for this discontent: (i) a general drift of the populace’s political views to the left; (ii) an increase in political activism by those who oppose reforms; (iii) a decline in the people’s trust of political actors; and (iv) the economic crisis. The paper’s principal finding is that the macroeconomic situation plays an important role in explaining the dissatisfaction with the reform process.

Tipo: Journal Article

Palavras-chave: Political economy; Reforms; Crisis; Latin America; P16; O54.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37219

The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Livestock Policy-making in Ethiopia

Halderman, Michael.

This paper presents a case study of how livestock policies are made and implemented in a national context, and how they can be improved to better serve the interests of the poor. Livestock are extremely important in Ethiopia and could play a key role in pro-poor development strategy. Livestock are estimated to contribute to the livelihoods of 60-70% of the Ethiopian population. There have been several negative livestock-related trends over the past 20-30 years, however, including a decline in: national and per capita production of livestock products, official livestock and livestock product exports and earnings from exports, and per capita consumption of food from livestock origin. The study used the key informant method supplemented with official...

Sensitive Product Treatment in Agricultural Trade Negotiations

Palavras-chave: Ethiopia; Political economy; Policy-making; Livestock; Pro-poor livestock policies; Livestock marketing; Livestock exports; Unofficial livestock marketing and exports; Cross border trade; SPS standards; Animal health services; Pastoralists; Pastoral areas; Pastoral development; Settling pastoralists; Highland areas; Urban and peri-urban areas; Land tenure; Governance; Decentralization; Civil society; Conflict mitigation; Political feasibility; Livestock Production/Industries; Political Economy.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23770

Durand-Morat, Alvaro; Wailes, Eric J.; Sharp, Misti.

The fact that trade, and especially agricultural trade, remains far from free is puzzling, since the superiority of free trade receives overwhelming support among economists (Gawande and Krishna, 2003; Rodrik, 1994). International trade scholars have devoted significant resources to forecasting the impact of trade policy reforms (for a survey of these studies see Congressional Budget Office, 2005), and their findings are relevant inputs for officials negotiating a trade agreement as well as for politicians in charge of ratifying it. The perceived gains and losses attached to different outcomes have been identified as a significant factor shifting the outcome of a trade agreement negotiation (McMillan, 1990). Less well-known are the factors that would...

Efficient choice among domestic and trade policies in the Grossman-Helpman Interest-Group Model

Palavras-chave: Trade negotiations; Agricultural trade; Free trade agreements; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; F59; Q17.

Ano: 2011

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103835

Schleich, Joachim; Orden, David.

This paper generalizes the recent political economy model of Helpman and Grossman in which contributions by producer lobbies and government decisions about trade policies are modeled as a common agency game. We allow the government to choose among domestic as well as trade interventions. When production and trade policies are available, the equilibrium production policies serve the lobbies while the trade policies reflect the country's international market power. When consumption and trade policies are available, tariffs and export subsidies are applied in a small-country model to serve the special interests, and the domestic policies are selected to restore consumer prices to world levels. In a large-country model, the optimal consumption and trade...

Environmental payments in conflicting situations between nature provision and cost minimization: a political economy approach

Palavras-chave: Political economy; Trade policies; Domestic subsidies and taxes; Efficient policies; Common agency; International Relations/Trade; F11; F13.

Ano: 1996

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7458

Nuppenau, Ernst-August.

We will analyze a newly emerging conflict within the second pillar of the rural development policy of the EU: a conflict between those farmers, who want to participate in high nature value agriculture, and farmers, who feel negatively impacted by supporting nature provision. We see a link through competition for land between nature provision in agriculture and cost minimal production of commercial farmers. The idea is to model this conflict using a political bargain approach and make a contribution on how to solve the conflict by innovative institutional arrangements. The power of groups will be analyzed and what governments can do.

Teaching Agricultural Policy Using Games: The Agripol Game

Palavras-chave: Conflict; Political economy; Nature provision; Community/Rural/Urban Development.

Ano: 2010

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95313

Jongeneel, Roelof A.; Koning, Niek.

We developed the AGRIPOL game as a tool for teaching agricultural policy to economic and non-economic students. AGRIPOL consists of a world with 7 different countries, each one represented by a small group of students. The students have to maximize their country's social welfare by choosing an optimal set of policy instruments. By doing this students learn in an interesting and hands-on way to understand the workings of agricultural policy instruments, the interrelatedness between countries (policy impact spill-overs) and the role of political weights in the policy formation process. A WTO negotiation round is included to let students experience the difficulties and benefits of cooperation.

The Political Economy of International Development and Pro-Poor Livestock Policies: A Comparative Assessment

Palavras-chave: Economics education; Political economy; Agricultural policy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; A2; P16; Q18.

Ano: 2005

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24773

Leonard, David K..

Peasant livestock producers are particularly disadvantaged internationally and within their national systems because their political participation tends to be mediated through patron-client ties. The consequence is that poor producers most often trade their collective interests for very modest individual (or village) benefits. These patron-client networks are now being extended internationally, generally making them still less advantageous. Eventually poor livestock producers will address their interests through political associations (i.e. horizontal groupings of peers) rather than clientage (which is vertical in orientation). In the meantime, however, without outside help they are unlikely to engage in effective proactive political action on issues...

Institutions and EU Decisions-Making: the 'Power' of the European Commission

Palavras-chave: Political economy; Livestock policy; Decentralization; New institutional economics; Patron-client relations; Neo-liberalism; Livestock Production/Industries; Political Economy.

Ano: 2004

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23785

Pokrivcak, Jan.

I develop a two-stage political economy model that explicitly models the complexity of decision-making in the European Union on the Common Agricultural Policy, and I derive how the institutional design affects the outcome and the influence of the various agents involved, and the likelihood of political stalemate.

Invasive Species Management Through Tariffs: Are Prevention and Protection Synonymous?

Palavras-chave: Political economy; European Union; Common Agricultural Policy; Voting; International Development.

Ano: 2002

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24862

Ranjan, Ram.

This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare...