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Aghion, Philippe; Van Reenen, John; Zingales, Luigi. |
We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Career Concerns; Innovation; Institutional Ownership; Productivity and R&D; Financial Economics; G20; G32; O31; O32; O33. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93414 |
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