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INFORMATION CASCADES WITH FINANCIAL MARKET PROFESSIONALS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY AgEcon
Alevy, Jonathan E.; Haigh, Michael S.; List, John A..
In settings where there is imperfect information about an underlying state of nature, but where inferences are made sequentially and are publicly observable, information cascades can lead to rational herding. Cascade phenomena may be seen in a variety of areas including technology adoption, financial market behavior, as well as in social processes such as mate selection or fads and fashions. Theories of rational herding have found a natural testing ground in experimental environments since the character of private and public information can be readily controlled. In previous experimental studies, behavior consistent with Bayesian benchmarks has been observed in simple contexts, but there are substantial reductions in experimental environments that...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Marketing.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18976
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Development and Initial Application of an Integrated Linear Programming/Social Accounting Model: Rangeland Livestock Application AgEcon
Harris, Thomas R.; Alevy, Jonathan E.; Kim, Man-Keun; Fadali, Betsy.
Changes in allocation of federal grazing permits to ranchers can impact not only local ranchers but the entire county economy itself. Regional impacts of changing grazing rights and grazing fees are measured by linking cattle production through a linear programming framework with a county level social accounting matrix (SAM) model.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Livestock Production/Industries.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8213
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AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF COMMON AGENCY AgEcon
Alevy, Jonathan E..
An equilibrium solution is developed for a common-agency game that is used to study the structure of regulatory bureaucracy. Contrary to existing results, this equilibrium maintains powerful incentives for the agent. An experiment is conducted to test the competing hypotheses. The implications of common-agency on reciprocity are also examined.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19876
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INFORMATION CASCADES: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT WITH FINANCIAL MARKET PROFESSIONALS AgEcon
Alevy, Jonathan E.; Haigh, Michael S.; List, John A..
In settings characterized by imperfect information about an underlying state of nature, but where inferences are made sequentially and are publicly observable, decisions may yield a "cascade" in which everyone herds on a single choice. While cascades potentially play a role in a variety of settings, from technology adoption to social processes such as mate selection, understanding cascade phenomena is imperative for financial markets. Previous empirical efforts studying cascade formation have used both naturally occurring data and laboratory experiments. In this paper, we combine one of the attractive elements of each line of research-observation of market professionals in a controlled environment-to push the investigation of cascade behavior into...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial Economics.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28608
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Right-to-Choose Auctions: A Field Study of Water Markets in the Limari Valley of Chile AgEcon
Alevy, Jonathan E.; Cristi, Oscar; Melo, Oscar.
Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limarí Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability were offered for sale by the research team. The auctions were supplemented by protocols to elicit risk and time preferences of bidders. We find that the right-to-choose auctions raise significantly more revenue than the benchmark sequential auction. Risk attitudes explain a substantial amount of the difference in bidding between auction institutions, consonant with received theory. The auction bidding revealed distinct preferences for water types, which has implications for market re-design.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Water market; Field experiment; Auction design; Farm Management; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Risk and Uncertainty.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90821
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A PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY AgEcon
Alevy, Jonathan E..
This paper applies a multi-tasking model of moral hazard to study the delegation of regulatory authority for health and environmental risks. The model characterizes the conditions under which single and multiple bureaucratic agencies are optimal, and relates these findings to discussions of appropriate regulation of agricultural biotechnology
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Political Economy.
Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20764
Registros recuperados: 6
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