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| Ameden, Holly A.; Cash, Sean B.; Zilberman, David. |
| This analysis presents a theoretical model of firm response to border enforcement and evaluates both the intended and unintended effects under two enforcement regimes: destruction versus treatment of contaminated shipments. The results indicate that importers may respond to increased inspection by reducing shipments and decreasing due care. In response to increased pest populations, firms may reduce shipments and increase due care, indicating that an enforcement response may not be necessary. The analysis reveals the importance of the nature of the due-care technology, as well as the relationships underlying the probability of detection, in determining the effects of enforcement. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Border enforcement; Environmental regulation; Invasive species; Trade and environment; F18; L51; Q17; Q56; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37112 |
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| Ameden, Holly A.; Cash, Sean B.; Zilberman, David. |
| Invasive species are a negative externality associated with imported goods. Policies aimed at excluding pests associated with imports include pre-shipment treatment requirements, varied inspection schemes, treatment at the border, penalties, and import bans or restrictions. Existing policies are based on the reasoning that increased enforcement effort will result in higher detection levels, or more specifically, that increased inspection will result in a higher number of interceptions and in turn, higher compliance. In addition to a deterrence effect, however, under which importers respond to increased enforcement with increased due care with respect to pest control, importers may respond in ways that regulators do not intend. For example, importers may... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9946 |
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