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Gauging the potential for social unrest AgEcon
Stark, Oded; Hyll, Walter; Behrens, Doris A..
It stands to reason that social unrest does not erupt out of the blue. Although there are a great many reasons why social dismay might descend into social disorder, only few yardsticks or indices can plausibly be used to gauge the potential for social unrest (PSU). If policy makers want to undertake public action to prevent social dismay escalating into social disruption, they obviously need to draw on practical sensors. This paper assesses critically the adequacy of two such measures, the polarization (P) index, and the total relative deprivation (TRD) index. The paper proposes a tentative guide to selecting between these two measures. A review of three stylized scenarios suggests that, where income redistributions reduce the number of distinct income...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social dismay; The potential for social unrest; Polarization; Total relative deprivation; Policy choice; Public Economics; D31; D63.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/53721
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An Evolutionary Edge of Knowing Less (or: On the "Curse" of Global Information) AgEcon
Stark, Oded; Behrens, Doris A..
Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his two adjacent neighbors. The trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two prisoner’s dilemma games played with his two neighbors. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous members of the group comprising his own father and a set of his father’s neighbors. The size of this set, which can vary, is termed the “span of information.” It is shown that a larger span of information can be detrimental to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection, and that in...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Span of interaction; Span of information; Imitation; Social welfare; Community/Rural/Urban Development; D83; R12; O4.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49924
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In search of an evolutionary edge: trading with a few, more, or many AgEcon
Stark, Oded; Behrens, Doris A..
Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the "span of interaction." Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma "rule of engagement." A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner’s dilemma games played with his m/2 neighbors to the left, and with his m/2 neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father’s span of interaction decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of the group comprising his father and his father’s m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Local interaction; Span of interaction; Imitation; Cooperation; Social welfare; Farm Management; D83; R12; O4.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94280
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On the Evolutionary Edge of Migration as an Assortative Mating Device AgEcon
Stark, Oded; Behrens, Doris A.; Wang, Yong.
Replaced with revised version of paper 02/27/08.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Labor and Human Capital.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6316
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