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| Nelson, Robert G.; Beil, Richard O., Jr.. |
| This experiment demonstrates principles of decision-making in dynamic oligopolies, especially the difficulties in forming and maintaining cartels. As an illustration of firm behavior under imperfect competition, the game distinguishes between procedurally rational choices and substantively rational decisions in the context of collusive, Cournot, and competitive equilibria. The paper discusses results from an actual classroom exercise and suggests some additional variations in institutional details. Instructions for students and a spreadsheet program for producing payoff tables are provided in the appendices. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Teaching; Experimental economics; Oligopoly; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15353 |
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| Nelson, Robert G.; Beil, Richard O., Jr.. |
| This simple classroom experiment demonstrates many of the behavioral phenomena associated with the voluntary provision of a public good. The mechanics of the game are explained in detail and complete instructions are provided, as well as suggestions for follow-up lectures. Influences such as anonymous voting, persuasion, returns to free-riding, and duration of association can be explored in connection with concepts of incentives, individual rationality, and group welfare. A number of variations and extensions can be used to incorporate prisoners' dilemmas, incentive compatible mechanisms, negative externalities, and Coasian bargaining. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Teaching; Experimental economics; Public goods; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
| Ano: 1994 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15171 |
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