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| Bellemare, Marc F.; Barrett, Christopher B.. |
| Reverse tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a common phenomenon. Yet, it does not fit existing theoretical models of sharecropping and has never before been modeled in the development microeconomics literature. We explain reverse tenancy contracts using an asset risk model that incorporates moral hazard. When choosing the terms of an agrarian contract, the landlord considers the impact of her choice on the probability that she will retain future rights to the rented land. Thus, this model captures the effect of tenure insecurity and property rights on agrarian contracts. The main testable implication of the theoretical model is that, as property rights become more secure, reverse tenancy tends to disappear. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22132 |
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| Bellemare, Marc F.; Barrett, Christopher B.; Osterloh, Sharon M.. |
| Pastoralists in East Africa's arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) regularly confront climatic shocks triggering massive herd die-offs and loss of scarce wealth. On the surface, it appears puzzling that pastoralists do not make extensive use of livestock markets to offload animals when climatic shocks temporarily reduce the carrying capacity of local rangelands, and then use markets to restock their herds when local conditions recover. In recent years, donors and policy makers have begun to hypothesize that investments in livestock marketing systems might quickly pay for themselves through reduced demand for relief aid,by increasing pastoralist marketing responsiveness to temporal variation in range conditions. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Marketing. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14749 |
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| Bellemare, Marc F.; Barrett, Christopher B.. |
| Do rural households in developing countries make market participation and volume decisions simultaneously or sequentially? This article develops a two-stage econometric model that allows testing between these two competing hypotheses regarding household-level market behavior. The first stage models the household's choice of whether to be a net buyer, autarkic, or a net seller in the market. The second stage models the quantity bought (sold) for net buyers (sellers) based on observable household characteristics. Using household data from Kenya and Ethiopia on livestock markets, we find evidence in favor of sequential decision-making, the welfare implications of which we discuss. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14748 |
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| Brown, Zachary S.; Bellemare, Marc F.. |
| We develop a method to structurally estimate principal-agent models by ordinary least squares (OLS). We set up a general principal-agent model which explicitly incorporates the wealth levels of each party and the opportunity cost to the agent of entering the contract. This yields an optimal contract that is linearized by way of an Nth order Taylor approximation. This in turn imposes N(3N-1)/2 restrictions on the parameters and yields an empirical test of the canonical principal-agent model. In the application, we consider the case where N = 2 and apply our method to a sample of land tenancy contracts in rural Madagascar. Empirical tests lead to consistent failure to reject the hypotheses derived from our structural model, which lends support to our... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Principal-Agent Models; Contract Theory; Structural Estimations; Risk and Uncertainty; C12; C13; D86; O12; Q12. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49368 |
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