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| Bromley, Daniel W.. |
| There are three general classes of environmental implications from agriculture: (1) amenity implications; (2) habitat implications; and (3) ecological implications. Environmental "benefits" or "costs" from agriculture require a prior specification of the norm against which the status quo is to be compared. Agriculture is no longer simply an activity that produces commodities for local, regional, national, or international markets. Indeed, in the OECD countries, commodity abundance, not commodity scarcity, is the norm and so it is necessary to see agriculture as primarily a land management activity that provides (and supports) rural livelihoods, and that happens also to produce some marketable commodities. This fundamental redefinition of agriculture... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12591 |
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| Bromley, Daniel W.. |
| Land-use conflicts highlight several myths about property rights. The central myth is that property rights are linked to natural rights, that property rights are durable and unchanging, and that any interference with these property rights requires public compensation. However, particular settings and circumstances lead to conflicting rights claims which the courts must sort through to determine where the more compelling rights claim resides. Situations are not protected because they have property rights. Rather, those situations found worthy of protection by the courts acquire the status of a property right. Property rights are not discovered, but are created by the courts. Applied economists must build models of property rights conflicts predicated upon... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31349 |
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| Bromley, Daniel W.. |
| The global commons represents a class of environmental problems that require international cooperation. Global environmental problems arise because the actions of some individuals or governments in one location hold serious implications for individuals and governments in other locations. There are global environmental policy problems because adversely-affected individuals (and governments) attempt to alter the behaviors of those responsible for global pollution. We develop a framework with which to analyze such global environmental problems. Our goal is to craft a resource management policy that will satisfy both those who seek a change and those who prefer the current situation. This environmental incentive policy will align the interests of the two... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/11899 |
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| Bystrom, Olof; Bromley, Daniel W.. |
| This study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31176 |
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| Bystrom, Olof; Bromley, Daniel W.. |
| This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country's government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other's environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority as a solution to the domestic pollution problem. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. To solve the international problem of pollution management of a common (water) resource, we propose an international agency with authority to write and enforce contracts in each of its member... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12620 |
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| Bromley, Daniel W.; Cochrane, Jeffrey A.. |
| We want to clarify the way in which we think about the global commons, particularly the problem of global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions and tropical deforestation. We develop a policy framework in which the policy goal is the sustainability of the earth's ability to absorb greenhouse gases. The framework considers the unequal incidence of benefits and costs of particular policies. We identify several resource management regimes and suggest that management under a common property regime is most appropriate. We conclude by identifying and briefly discussing types of policies that can achieve sustainability. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1994 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/11890 |
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