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| Bystrom, Olof; Bromley, Daniel W.. |
| This study presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural nonpoint-source pollution. The analysis is based on a principal-agent framework with two parties: farmers and a regulating authority. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. Unlike previous analyses of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest nonindividual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority, where farmers can trade pollution abatement efforts. Findings show that the information requirement of a regulatory agency can be substantially reduced if contracts can be made nonindividual. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31176 |
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| Bystrom, Olof; Bromley, Daniel W.. |
| This paper presents an incentive scheme to control agricultural non-point-source pollution. The analysis is based on a nested agent framework with three parties; farmers, a country's government, and the governments of all countries that affect each other's environmental quality. Unlike previous analysis of incentive schemes to control agricultural pollution, we suggest non-individual contracts between farmers and a regulating authority as a solution to the domestic pollution problem. Our incentive scheme proposes collective penalties as a way to control pollution. To solve the international problem of pollution management of a common (water) resource, we propose an international agency with authority to write and enforce contracts in each of its member... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12620 |
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