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| Calcott, Paul; Walls, Margaret. |
| Several studies that have solved for optimal solid waste policy instruments have suggested that transaction costs may often prevent the working of recycling markets. In this paper, we explicitly incorporate such costs into a general equilibrium model of production, consumption, recycling, and disposal. Specifically, we assume that consumers have access to both recycling without payment and recycling with payment but that the latter option comes with transaction costs. Producers choose material and nonmaterial inputs to produce a consumer product, and they also choose design attributes of that product-its weight and degree of recyclability. We find that the policy instruments that yield a social optimum in this setting need to vary with the degree of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Dfe; Deposit-refund; Disposal fee; Constrained optimum; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q28. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10900 |
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| Calcott, Paul; Walls, Margaret. |
| Several studies have shown the efficiency of both a Pigovian tax on waste disposal and a deposit-refund instrument, that is a combined output tax and recycling subsidy. The efficiency of these instruments, however, critically depends on households being paid for recycling. In reality, although most households have access to curbside recycling services, they are not paid for the items they set out at the curb. All items placed in a recycling bin are thus of equal value to a household, and there is no incentive for producers to make their products any more recyclable than what is necessary to be eligible for the bin. This paper characterizes the constrained (second-best) optimum that exists with the missing recycling market and solves for a modified... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Solid waste; Regulatory policy; Regulatory design; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; Q28. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10567 |
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