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| Stoneham, Gary; Chaudhri, Vivek; Ha, Arthur; Strappazzon, Loris. |
| The present paper proposes that markets for nature conservation on private land are missing because of the problem of asymmetric information. An auction of conservation contracts was designed to reveal hidden information needed to facilitate meaningful transactions between landholders and government. The present paper describes the key elements of auction and contract design employed and the results obtained from a pilot auction of conservation contracts run in two regions of Victoria. The pilot demonstrated that it was possible to create at least the supply side of a market for nature conservation and in conjunction with a defined budget, prices were discovered and resources allocated through contracts with landholders. The present paper compares a... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118151 |
