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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Chavez, Carlos A. (5) Stranlund, John K. (5) Gomez, Walter (1) Villena, Mauricio G. (1) Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (5) L51 (4) Emissions Taxes (3) Public Economics (3) Uncertainty (3) Q28 (2) Q58 (2) Risk and Uncertainty (2) Administrative Costs (1) Asymmetric Information (1) Compliance (1) Efficiency (1) Enforcement (1) Environmental policy (1) H23 (1) Incomplete Information (1) Monitoring (1) Nonpoint pollution (1) Pigouvian Taxes (1) Pollution Control (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (5) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (1) 2008 (1) 2007 (1) 2004 (1) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última A Note on Emissions Taxes and Incomplete Information AgEcon Chavez, Carlos A.; Stranlund, John K.. In contrast with what we perceive is the conventional wisdom about setting emissions taxes under uncertainty, we demonstrate that setting a uniform tax equal to expected marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and damages from pollution. We show that efficient taxes will deviate from expected marginal damage if there is uncertainty about the slopes of the marginal abatement costs of regulated firms. Moreover, efficient emissions tax rates will vary across firms if a regulator can use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Incomplete Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42129 ENFORCING TRANSFERABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS IN THE PRESENCE OF TRANSACTION COSTS AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.. In this paper we examine the impacts of transaction costs on enforcing a transferable emissions permit system. We derive an enforcement strategy with a self-reporting requirement that achieves complete compliance in a cost-effective manner. In the absence of transaction costs targeted enforcement-the practice of monitoring some firms more closely than others-is neither necessary nor desirable. In the presence of constant marginal transaction costs, buyers of permits should be monitored more closely than sellers, but within groups of buyers and sellers monitoring should be uniform. When marginal transaction costs are not constant, effective monitoring will depend on whether a firm is a buyer or seller, its demand for permits relative to its initial... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14527 The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.; Villena, Mauricio G.. We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Asymmetric Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7387 Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused by Households: Uncertainty, Prices, and Income AgEcon Chavez, Carlos A.; Stranlund, John K.; Gomez, Walter. We examine the control of air pollution caused by households burning wood for heating and cooking in the developing world. Since the problem is one of controlling emissions from nonpoint sources, regulations are likely to be directed at household choices of wood consumption and combustion technologies. Moreover, these choices are subtractions from, or contributions to, the pure public good of air quality. Consequently, the efficient policy design is not independent of the distribution of household income. Since it is unrealistic to assume that environmental authorities can make lump sum income transfers part of control policies, efficient control of air pollution caused by wood consumption entails a higher tax on wood consumption and a higher subsidy for... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Efficiency; Urban air pollution; Nonpoint pollution; Environmental policy; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; H23; Q28. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93964 Who Should Bear the Administrative Costs of an Emissions Tax? AgEcon Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.. All environmental policies involve administrative costs, the costs of implementing and managing policies that extend beyond abatement costs. We examine theoretically the optimal distribution of these costs between the public and regulated sources of pollution. The distribution of administrative costs affects social welfare only if public funds are more expensive than private funds, or if the distribution of administrative costs affects the size of a regulated industry. If having the public take on a larger part of administrative costs increases the size of the industry and this does not lead to lower emissions for a given emissions tax, then it is optimal to make the pollution sources bear all of the administrative costs. A necessary, but not sufficient,... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Emissions Taxes; Pigouvian Taxes; Administrative Costs; Pollution Control; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102266 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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