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| Registros recuperados: 16 | |
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| Suhler, Diane Rizzuto; Cook, Michael L.. |
| The earliest state cooperative laws in the United States were stock laws modeled upon the Rochdale experience and were adaptations of basic corporate laws of incorporation to the cooperative form of organization. They emphasized stock as the basis of membership and the distribution of profits to members in proportion to patronage. After 1911, the dominant form of cooperative law became the nonstock law. which emphasized service at cost and the personal. fraternal nature of membership in a cooperative. Since 1925. both forms of cooperative law have coexisted. The different emphasis placed on capital stock. profit. and membership in a cooperative by the two different legal structures may be one contributing factor to current dilemmas cooperative leaders face... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 1993 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46392 |
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| Cook, Michael L.. |
| Mintzburg’s managerial working role model is used to explore the ways roles and behavior of the general manager of a user-oriented firm differ from those of the manager of an investor-owned firm (IOF). It is argued that, in the roles of conflict resolution, resource allocation, information spokesperson, and leadership, the challenges of a user-oriented manager are not only significantly different but often more difficult. It is concluded that managers comfortable with complexity; technical-operation, people-oriented resource allocation; multi-stakeholder communication; and with strong coalition- building skills are most successful in user-oriented organizations. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 1994 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46402 |
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| Chaddad, Fabio Ribas; Cook, Michael L.. |
| This paper examines agricultural cooperative organizational models from an ownership rights perspective. Building upon property rights and incomplete contracts theories of the firm, the paper adopts a definition of ownership rights comprising both residual claim and control rights. We argue that alternative cooperative organizational models differ in the way ownership rights are defined and assigned to the economic agents tied contractually to the firm - members, patrons, and investors. Based on multiple case study evidence, the paper proposes a typology of discrete organizational models, in which the traditional cooperative structure and the investor-oriented firm (IOF) are characterized as polar forms. Additionally, we identify five non-traditional... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26032 |
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| Burress, Molly J.; Cook, Michael L.. |
| We document an increasing prevalence of the term ―collective entrepreneurship‖ in scholarly research. By examining the context in which the term is utilized, we present a framework through which to understand motivations for research in collective entrepreneurship and the variety of entrepreneurial endeavors described as collective entrepreneurship. We identify five primary motivations for research: advancement of theory, intra-organizational efficiency, inter-organizational gains, economic growth and development, and socio-political change. We find preliminary evidence collective entrepreneurs may be able to generate rents inaccessible to the sole entrepreneur. In addition, we propose mechanisms which foster entrepreneurship may differ for sole and... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92628 |
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| Chaddad, Fabio Ribas; Cook, Michael L.. |
| It is commonly argued in the literature that agricultural cooperatives are financially constrained because they are unable to acquire sufficient risk capital to invest in productive assets. This study examines whether agricultural cooperatives' investment is constrained by estimating neoclassical and cash flow augmented Q investment models. Panel data regression results suggest that cooperative physical capital investment responds positively and significantly to both the marginal profitability of capital and cash flow. Results also indicate that all cooperative sub-samples face binding financial constraints when making investment decisions, but some cooperatives appear to be less financially constrained than others. The empirical analysis of the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26045 |
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| Cook, Michael L.; Burress, Molly J.; Iliopoulos, Constantine. |
| Abstract—Existing research treats the cooperative structure as relatively homogeneous. The proposed paper argues that all cooperatives are not created equal – and consideration of organizational structure is critical when analyzing the economic impact of cooperation. In recent empirical work, we observe cooperatives forming as single- or multi-purpose; generating equity capital passively, quasi-passively, or proactively; vertically integrating in a centralized, federated, or a hybrid fashion; governing through fixed or proportional control rights; and instituting open, closed or class-varying membership criteria. The emergence of multiple-level rent-seeking cooperatives challenges our traditional rent dispersion models of collective action. We call these... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Collective entrepreneurship; Agribusiness; Property Rights; Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44397 |
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| Cook, Michael L.; Plunkett, Brad. |
| This paper introduces and defines the concept of collective entrepreneurship. A review of the defensive single-level rent-seeking objective of traditional agricultural cooperatives is introduced followed by an analysis of recent studies documenting a shift in the objective functions of producers jointly integrating toward more multiple-level rent-seeking entities. This process of shifting from market failure-ameliorating collective action mechanisms toward rent-seeking group action organizations is labeled collective entrepreneurship. The justification for introducing this concept is based on the Olsonian premise that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests without coercion or selective incentives. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural cooperatives; Entrepreneurship; Agribusiness; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Labor and Human Capital; D23; D72; Q13. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43777 |
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| Registros recuperados: 16 | |
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