Home Itens selecionados Provedores de dados OAI Créditos Sobre Ajuda

			Busca avançada
	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Cooley, Thomas (2) Clementi, Gian Luca (1) Di Giannatale, Sonia (1) Gian Luca, Clementi (1) Palavra-chave Financial Economics (2) CEO (1) D82 (1) D86 (1) D92 (1) Firm Dynamics (1) G32 (1) G34 (1) Hidden Action (1) Incentives (1) J33 (1) M52 (1) Moral Hazard (1) Options (1) Pay–Performance Sensitivity (1) Principal Agent (1) Stock (1) Survival (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2010 (2) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última A Theory of Firm Decline AgEcon Gian Luca, Clementi; Cooley, Thomas; Di Giannatale, Sonia. We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter keeps on growing, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Principal Agent; Moral Hazard; Hidden Action; Incentives; Survival; Firm Dynamics; Financial Economics; D82; D86; D92; G32. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92788 Executive Compensation: Facts AgEcon Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas. In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Notable facts are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of security grants has increased over time; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: CEO; Pay–Performance Sensitivity; Stock; Options; Financial Economics; G34; J33; M52. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92834 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610 Política de Privacidade Área restrita		Embrapa Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n° Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901 Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco