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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (7) Autor Dimitrov, Dinko (7) Lazarova, Emiliya A. (2) Sung, Shao Chin (2) Chin Sung, Shao (1) Haake, Claus-Jochen (1) Puppe, Clemens (1) Mais... Palavra-chave D71 (4) Core (3) C71 (2) C78 (2) Coalitions (2) Hedonic Games (2) J41 (2) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (2) Stability (2) Additive Preferences (1) C63 (1) C70 (1) Coalition Formation (1) Common Rankings (1) Computational Complexity (1) D02 (1) D70 (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Group Identity (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (7) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (1) 2009 (1) 2008 (2) 2006 (2) País United States (7) Idioma Inglês (7)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 7 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core AgEcon Dimitrov, Dinko; Haake, Claus-Jochen. We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political Economy. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12175 Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players AgEcon Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Dimitrov, Dinko. We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Coalitions; Core; Stability; Status-seeking; Environmental Economics and Policy; C78; J41; D71. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96838 Non-bossy Social Classification AgEcon Dimitrov, Dinko; Puppe, Clemens. We consider the problem of how societies should be partitioned into classes if individuals express their views about who should be put with whom in the same class. A non-bossiness condition makes the social aggregator dependent only on those cells of the individual partitions the society members classify themselves in. This information is used to construct for each profile of views an opinion graph. By means of natural sovereignty and liberalism requirements, we characterize the non-bossy aggregators generating partitions in which the social classes are refinements of the connected components in the opinion graph. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Social Aggregation; Group Identity; Liberalism; Non-bossiness; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; D71. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55328 A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games AgEcon Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko. We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12168 Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games AgEcon Dimitrov, Dinko; Chin Sung, Shao. We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Core; Hedonic Games; Monotonicity; Stable Sets; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C71. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/115722 Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games AgEcon Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko. We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Additive Preferences; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Hedonic Games; NP-hard; NP-complete; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C63; C70; C71; D02; D70; D71. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46655 Coalitional Matchings AgEcon Dimitrov, Dinko; Lazarova, Emiliya A.. A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in and over the student groups he would like to teach to. Correspondingly, each student has preferences over the groups of students he wants to study with and over the teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides, the restriction of agents’ preferences over groups to strict orderings, and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Coalitions; Common Rankings; Core; Stability; Totally Balanced Games; Two-Sided Matchings; C78; J41; D71. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37523 Registros recuperados: 7 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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