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Democracy, Property Rights, Income Equality, and Corruption AgEcon
Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno.
This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a political economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as a control of corruption if the property rights system works and there is a low level of income inequality. On the other hand if property...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Democracy; Income inequality; Property rights; Political Economy; D73; H11; P16.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99685
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The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China AgEcon
Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno.
In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher wages of government employees are markedly less corrupt; while social heterogeneity, regulation, abundance of resource and state-owned enterprises substantially breed regional corruption. Moreover, fiscal decentralization is discovered to depress corruption significantly, while administrative decentralization fosters local corruption. We also find that there is currently a positive relationship between corruption and economic development in China that is mainly driven...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; China; Government; Decentralization; Deterrence; Social Heterogeneity; Political Economy; D730; H110; K420.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91024
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Corruption and Political Interest: Empirical Evidence at the Micro Level AgEcon
Torgler, Benno; Dong, Bin.
The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical evidence regarding the determinants of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by analyzing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey. We explore the determinants of corruption through two dependent variables (perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption). The impact of political interest on corruption is explored through three different proxies, presenting empirical evidence at both the cross-country level and the within-country level. The results...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; Political Interest; Social Norms; K420; D720; O170; J240.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/36763
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The Consequences of Corruption: Evidences from China AgEcon
Dong, Bin; Torgler, Benno.
With complementary Chinese data sets and alternative corruption measures, we explore the consequences of corruption. Adopting a novel approach we provide evidence that corruption can have both, positive and negative effects, on economic development. The overall impact of corruption might be the balance of the two simultaneous effects within a specific institutional environment (“grease the wheels” and “sand the wheels”). Corruption is observed to considerably increase income inequality in China. We also find that corruption strongly reduces tax revenue. Looking at things from an expenditure point of view we observe that corruption significantly decreases government spending on education, R&D and public health in China. We also observe that regional...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Corruption; China; Government; Economic Development; Inequality; Environment; Political Economy; D720; H110; K420.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91006
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