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| Edwards, Claire; Eigenraam, Mark. |
| The production and consumption of environmental goods and services are subject to many of the problems associated with public goods. Due to their non-rival and non-excludable nature, incentives for individuals to invest in their production are often absent. To address this market failure, government agencies have used a number of policy mechanisms to procure the supply of environmental outcomes on behalf of society. Recently, conservation tenders focussing on private land have been a favoured policy instrument used by many government agencies to purchase environmental outcomes in the public interest. The majority of these environmental tenders have focussed on a single environmental outcome. It is contended in this paper that multiple environmental... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100545 |
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| Eigenraam, Mark; Chua, Joselito J.; Edwards, Claire. |
| Conservation auctions are increasingly being used to procure public environmental goods on private land. In the absence of demand-side price information, the majority of conservation auctions in Australia have been designed without a reserve price. In these instances bids have been accepted in order of cost-effectiveness until the budget constraint binds. It is widely recognised that in situations where auctions are run repeatedly a reserve price strategy could allow for a more efficient allocation of funds across multiple rounds, both spatially and temporally. This paper provides a brief overview of methods for determining a reserve price for application in conservation auctions. It is concluded that information deficiencies and the high transaction costs... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101406 |
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