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| Glebe, Thilo W.. |
| This article deals with the optimal differentiation of agri-environmental contracts based on a self-selection mechanism. The paper demonstrates that both economic efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures can be increased, if a menu of combinations of farming practices and payments are offered. However, there is a trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness, since the optimal programme minimising government expenses does not simultaneously minimise farmers’ opportunity costs. A numerical example of differentiated agri-environmental contracts, aiming for the reduction of nitrogen fertiliser in wheat production, illustrates that efficiency and effectiveness gains can be substantial. Furthermore, it is shown that economic rents for agricultural... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agri-environmental policy; Efficiency; Adverse selection; Mechanism design; Self-selection; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97185 |
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| Salhofer, Klaus; Glebe, Thilo W.. |
| The number of agri-environmental programs, as well as the share of agricultural land covered under these programs, varies significantly between EU member states. We analyze national differences in the uptake of agri-environmental programs by developing a model of countries' political objective function. Based on this model we identify six factors which may explain the extent to which agri-environmental policies are implemented: environmental benefits, opportunity costs of participation, financial budget pressure, the share of program expenditures financed by the EU, contribution to the EU budget, and political weight attributed to farmers' income. The conceptual approach is then supplemented by an empirical analysis. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20191 |
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| Glebe, Thilo W.; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. |
| This paper develops an extended general equilibrium model of international trade in order to analyze the welfare effects of agricultural trade liberalization if a large country influences its terms of trade by means of environmental policy. We derive globally optimal first-best and second-best environmental and trade policy combinations as a benchmark for assessing the trade-distorting character of strategically motivated environmental policies and demonstrate that if second-best rather than first-best policies are chosen as a benchmark the conclusions may differ not only in magnitude but also in direction. We further demonstrate that if a Pigouvian instrument is transformed into a strategic environmental policy, following trade liberalization, the global... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20277 |
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| Glebe, Thilo W.. |
| This paper analyses how the enlargement of a trade bloc will affect national welfare. We establish a partial equilibrium model of a trade bloc either operating as a monopoly with a competitive fringe or facing a duopolistic game in production taxes/subsidies. Given this framework, we demonstrate how member countries’ welfare effects depend on their trade flow and the market power of the trade bloc. A numerical estimation of the effects of EU enlargement on the major grain crop markets suggests that welfare effects are negligible. Economic reasons are therefore unlikely to be a motivating force for further enlargement. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Trade bloc; Trade liberalisation; Game theory; European Union; International Relations/Trade; D42; F11; Q17; Q18. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58061 |
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| Salhofer, Klaus; Glebe, Thilo W.. |
| The number of agri-environmental programs launched under EU Regulation 1257/99, as well as the share of agricultural land covered under these programs, varies significantly between EU member states. National differences in the uptake of agri-environmental schemes would be economically efficient if they accounted for differences in countries' natural capacity to assimilate pollution and reflected the social value attributed to environmental quality. However, political decisions are unlikely to be influenced only by efficiency consideration. This paper assesses the distributional, budgetary and welfare effects of agri-environmental programs and analyses how this may explain the pattern of agri-environmental policy in Europe. The study is based on an... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25565 |
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| Glebe, Thilo W.; Salhofer, Klaus. |
| Small countries may benefit from the formation of a trade bloc, since their combined market power will enable them to manipulate the terms of trade. The question of interest is whether countries will benefit from the enlargement of a trading bloc, if trade liberalization induces countries to substitute domestic support measures for conventional border protection. The paper deals with this question by analyzing the conditions for positive welfare effects resulting from the enlargement of a trade bloc. Based on a partial equilibrium trade model, we consider a game in production taxes/subsidies between two trade blocs. The tax/subsidy instrument may capture the production effect which can be induced by a combination of environmental, health or safety rules.... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Trade bloc; Trade liberalization; Game theory; European Union; International Relations/Trade; D6; F11; Q17; C7. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25529 |
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