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| Abatania, Luke N.; Hailu, Atakelty; Mugera, Amin W.. |
| Crop production is the main source of livelihood for households in Northern Ghana. The government is committed to improving crop production and knowledge about the technical efficiency of crop farms is essential in guiding policy decisions. This paper examined the technical efficiency of 189 crop farms in Northern Ghana using data envelopment analysis (DEA) with bootstrapping. We found that bias-corrected average technical efficiency of the sample farms is 77.26%. The estimated scale efficiency is 94.21%. In a second stage regression, we found that hired labour, geographical location of farms, gender and age of head of household significantly affect technical efficiency. Policy implications of the results are discussed. |
| Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Technical efficiency; DEA; Bootstrap; Ghana; OLS regression.; Farm Management. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124211 |
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| Hailu, Atakelty; Schilizzi, Steven. |
| Auctions are increasingly being considered as a mechanism for allocating conservation contracts to private landowners. This interest is based on the widely held belief that competitive bidding helps minimize information rents. This study constructs an agent-based model to evaluate the long term performance of conservation auctions under settings where bidders are allowed to learn from previous outcomes. The results clearly indicate that the efficiency benefits of one-shot auctions are quickly eroded under dynamic settings. Furthermore, the auction mechanism is found to be inferior to fixed payment schemes except when the latter involve the use of high reserve prices. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57883 |
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| Hailu, Atakelty; Schilizzi, Steven; Thoyer, Sophie. |
| There is a growing interest in using auctions for purchasing public goods from private agents. Auctions are being trialed in Australia and elsewhere to allocate conservation contracts. The expectation is that competitive bidding will reduce information rents and increase cost-effectiveness. This paper examines how auctions would perform under different assumptions regarding the rationality of bidders. A theoretical model requires bidders to be rational and use Nash equilibrium strategies, while an agent-based model assumes boundedly rational bidders learning from experience. The study illustrates the synergies between economic theory and agent-based modelling. Our findings provide a cautionary message regarding the performance of conservation auctions. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19478 |
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