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| Registros recuperados: 11 | |
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| Feng, Li; Hendrikse, George W.J.. |
| In the 1950s and 1960s there was a debate about the nature of an agricultural cooperative: the cooperative as extension of the farm, the cooperative as vertical integration or the cooperative as a firm. We revisit this debate with various concepts from the theory of the firm that have been formulated since 1990. Two concepts shed light on this debate: the enterprise as a system of attributes and the delineation of a governance structure in terms of ownership rights, control rights and income rights. We argue that viewing the cooperative as a system of attributes integrates these three views. It emphasizes that a cooperative is a firm in itself, with many independent input suppliers as owners. The feature of many input suppliers as owners implies that the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44398 |
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| Hendrikse, George W.J.. |
| A model is presented in which spot and contract market exchange co-exist. A contract consists of a delivery requirement between an upstream and a downstream party. Contract formation determines to a certain extent the probability distribution of the spot market price. This contract formation externality entails the removal of high reservation price buyers and various sellers from the spot market. The first effect decreases the expected spot market price when the number of contracts is small, whereas the decrease in the number of sellers and additional residual contract demand increase the expected spot market price beyond a certain number of contracts. It implies an endogenous upper bound on the number of contracts. Contract prices are positively related... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Spot market; Contract externality; Co-existence; Delivery requirement; Marketing; D40; L10. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21041 |
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| Hendrikse, George W.J.; Hu, Yamei. |
| Various studies show that agricultural cooperatives behave differently than their investor-owned counterparts. One explanation may be that the internal decision making process differs in these two governance structures. A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may outweigh architecture choice and that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives are efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that competition may increase the attractiveness of investor-owned firms and circumstances are determined in which cooperatives and investor owned firms coexist in equilibrium. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Architecture; Screening; Cooperatives; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24522 |
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| Hu, Yamei; Huang, Zuhui; Hendrikse, George W.J.; Xu, Xuchu. |
| A description and analysis of China's Farmer Specialized Cooperatives is presented. Data is presented regarding the historical development of farmer cooperatives in China, the membership composition of a sample of 66 farmer cooperatives in the Zhejiang province, and the various attributes (governance, quality control system, and strategy) of a watermelon cooperative in this province. Many cooperatives are being transformed in organizations with a market orientation. These cooperatives exhibit substantial heterogeneity, in terms of farmers being member and skewness in the distribution of control rights. Human asset specificity in terms of establishing and maintaining relations and access to markets seems to be more important than physical asset specificity... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Farmer Cooperative; China; Governance Structure; Business Strategy; Agribusiness; Q13. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25610 |
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| Hendrikse, George W.J.. |
| The increasing differentiation on the supply side of agricultural and horticultural markets has resulted in many governance structure changes between growers and wholesalers. For example, marketing cooperatives are restructured, heterogeneous associations split up in various one-product associations, growers integrate forward into wholesaling, and so on. These developments are analysed with an incomplete contracting model addressing horizontal as well as vertical relationships in a multilateral setting. The interactions between authority, access, and countervailing power in the choice of governance structure are highlighted. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20046 |
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| Registros recuperados: 11 | |
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