|
|
|
|
|
| Hendrikse, George W.J.; Hu, Yamei. |
| Various studies show that agricultural cooperatives behave differently than their investor-owned counterparts. One explanation may be that the internal decision making process differs in these two governance structures. A model is developed to explore how endogenous screening rules affect efficient organizational choices and industrial structures. It is shown that screening level choice may outweigh architecture choice and that screening rules are strategic substitutes. Conditions are derived under which cooperatives are efficient organizational forms. It is also shown that competition may increase the attractiveness of investor-owned firms and circumstances are determined in which cooperatives and investor owned firms coexist in equilibrium. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Architecture; Screening; Cooperatives; Duopoly; Agribusiness; Q13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24522 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
| Hu, Yamei; Huang, Zuhui; Hendrikse, George W.J.; Xu, Xuchu. |
| A description and analysis of China's Farmer Specialized Cooperatives is presented. Data is presented regarding the historical development of farmer cooperatives in China, the membership composition of a sample of 66 farmer cooperatives in the Zhejiang province, and the various attributes (governance, quality control system, and strategy) of a watermelon cooperative in this province. Many cooperatives are being transformed in organizations with a market orientation. These cooperatives exhibit substantial heterogeneity, in terms of farmers being member and skewness in the distribution of control rights. Human asset specificity in terms of establishing and maintaining relations and access to markets seems to be more important than physical asset specificity... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Farmer Cooperative; China; Governance Structure; Business Strategy; Agribusiness; Q13. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25610 |
| |
|
|
|
