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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Furtan, William Hartley (2) Jensen, Maria Skovager (2) Sauer, Johannes (2) Palavra-chave Agricultural and Food Policy (2) Common Agricultural Policy (2) Free-riding (2) Rent-seeking (2) D72 (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) International Relations/Trade (1) Political Economy (1) Q18 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Ano 2008 (2) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Rent Seeking and the Common Agricultural Policy: Do member countries free ride on lobbying? AgEcon Furtan, William Hartley; Jensen, Maria Skovager; Sauer, Johannes. The Common Agricultural Policy is modelled as a club good providing the European Union (EU) farmer with financial benefits. We build an economic model which explains how much farmers in individual EU countries invest in rent-seeking activities in order to test for free-riding behaviour on lobbying costs. For our investigation we group the EU member countries by farm structure, and the type of benefit received. We explain the fees paid by farmers for lobbying by other countries fees, political variables, and country and regional agricultural characteristics. The model shows that some member countries free ride on others. This suggests a form of policy path dependency and leads to a suboptimal investment on lobbying of 7.5%. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Free-riding; Rent-seeking; Common Agricultural Policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; D72; Q18. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6600 RENT SEEKING AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: DO MEMBER COUNTRIES FREE RIDE ON LOBBYING? AgEcon Furtan, William Hartley; Jensen, Maria Skovager; Sauer, Johannes. The Common Agricultural Policy is modelled as a club good providing the European Union (EU) farmer with financial benefits. We build an economic model which explains how much farmers in individual EU countries invest in rent-seeking activities in order to test for free-riding behaviour on lobbying costs. For our investigation we group the EU member countries by farm structure, and the type of benefit received. We explain the fees paid by farmers for lobbying by other countries fees, political variables, and country and regional agricultural characteristics. The model shows that some member countries free ride on others. This suggests a form of policy path dependency and leads to a suboptimal investment on lobbying of 7.5%. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Free-riding; Rent-seeking; Common Agricultural Policy; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52649 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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