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INTERNATIONAL TRADE: HOW IT AFFECTS VIRGINIA AGRICULTURE AgEcon
Johnson, Martin; Peterson, Everett B..
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14824
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Bringing Agriculture into the GATT: Potential Use of an Aggregate Measure of Support AgEcon
Ballenger, Nicole; McClatchy, Don; de Filippis, Fabrizio; Mercier, Stephanie; Dixit, Praveen M.; Miner, William M.; Guyomard, Herve; Roe, Terry L.; Hertel, Thomas W.; Rossmiller, George Edward; Johnson, Martin; Sharples, Jerry A.; Josling, Timothy E.; Tsigas, Marinos E.; Mahe, Louis Adrien Pascal.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1990 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49867
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The GATT Negotiations and US/EC Agricultural Policies Solutions to Noncooperative Games AgEcon
Johnson, Martin; Roe, Terry L.; Mahe, Louis Adrien Pascal.
Countries cooperate in negotiating treaties. However, treaty compliance is noncooperative; signatories comply with treaties only if compliance leaves them better off than noncompliance. US and EC agricultural policies of 1986 are modeled through a noncooperative game. Bilateral treaties, formalizations of Nash Equilibria, are presented which improve US and EC welfare.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1989 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7491
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Politically Acceptable Trade Compromises Between The EC and The US: A Game Theory Approach AgEcon
Johnson, Martin; Mahe, Louis Adrien Pascal; Roe, Terry L..
A model is developed to quantify the special status of agriculture in the US and the EC trade negotiations. The role of special interests are measured by a policy goals function (PGF) whose weights are estimated for each special interest group. The analysis searches for mutually acceptable, mutually advantageous trade agreements between the US and the EC using a partial equilibrium world trade model coupled with game theory. Results suggest that it is in the best interest of the US (resp. EC) 'for the EC (resp. US) to liberalize whi1e the other follows the status quo policies of 1986. Mutual gains in PGF values to both countries pursuing "large" liberalizations are unlikely to exist, although "small" liberalizations may give rise to "small" mutual gains....
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Game theory; Trade liberalization; Trade negotiations; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1990 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51154
Registros recuperados: 4
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