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| Registros recuperados: 87 | |
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| Sethi, Gautam; Costello, Christopher; Fisher, Anthony C.; Hanemann, W. Michael; Karp, Larry S.. |
| Among others who point to environmental variability and managerial uncertainty as causes of fishery collapse, Roughgarden and Smith (1996) argue that three sources of uncertainty are important for fisheries management: variability in fish dynamics, inaccurate stock size estimates, and inaccurate implementation of harvest quotas. We develop a bioeconomic model with these three sources of uncertainty, and solve for optimal escapement based on measurements of fish stock in a discrete-time model. Among other results we find: (1) when uncertainties are high, we generally reject the constant-escapement rule advocated in much of the existing literature, (2) inaccurate stock estimation affects policy in a fundamentally different way than the other sources of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25117 |
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| Beghin, John C.; Karp, Larry S.. |
| The problem of choosing second-best trade policies is modified by including sector-specific policies as well as tariffs. We obtain conditions under which reduction of the largest tariff is welfare improving. Formulae for the optimal tariff and sector-specific subsidy are used to study the design of optimal policy menus. The theory is illustrated by an empirical general equilibrium model of the U. S. economy which emphasizes agriculture. The model suggests that reductions in agricultural protection in the United States would be welfare improving. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 1990 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6091 |
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| Karp, Larry S.; Zhao, Jinhua. |
| A reform to the Kyoto Protocol that allows signatories to pay a fine instead of meeting the target level of abatement would achieve three goals. First, it would defuse one U.S. objection to the agreement: the concern that the cost of achieving the target might turn out to be extremely high. Second, unlike other cost-reducing measures (such as trade in pollution permits) it would increase the equilibrium number of signatories in a non-cooperative participation game. Third, it would make it easier to force signatories to comply with their obligations. We study the participation game under an escape clause using both a Nash Equilibrium and the concept of a stable set when nations are “farsighted”. We compare our results to a prominent model of International... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6857 |
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| Registros recuperados: 87 | |
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