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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Kim, Taeho (3) Weaver, Robert D. (3) Palavra-chave Risk and Uncertainty (2) DEA (1) Environment performance (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Pollution (1) Technical efficiency (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (3) Ano 2002 (1) 2001 (1) 1999 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última CROP INSURANCE CONTRACTING: MORAL HAZARD COSTS THROUGH SIMULATION AgEcon Weaver, Robert D.; Kim, Taeho. Moral hazard costs are estimated using a new crop insurance design approach. The simulation results show that incorporation of incentive compatibility constraints into insurance design can substantially reduce moral hazard costs. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20729 TARGETING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN AGRICULTURE: IPM AND BMPS AS ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AgEcon Weaver, Robert D.; Kim, Taeho. Nonparametric technical efficiency estimates of potentially polluting input use in soybean and wheat indicate substantial heterogeneity across farms. This implies large costs would be associated with uniform standards or incentives to regulate these inputs. While technical efficiency is not observable, indicators of environmentally beneficial practices are found useful predictors. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Technical efficiency; DEA; Environment performance; Pollution; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21576 Designing Crop Insurance to Manage Moral Hazard Costs AgEcon Weaver, Robert D.; Kim, Taeho. A new crop insurance model based on just random risk (natural states) is presented instead of traditional model based on random risk, guaranteed price, and guaranteed yield. The simulation approach shows how the incentive compatibility constraints resolve the moral hazard problem by the insured under the insurer-agency crop insurance contracting. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24784 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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