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| Kinateder, Markus. |
| Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Dynamic Competitive Group Formation; Imperfect Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C73; D85. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50722 |
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| Kinateder, Markus. |
| Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Network; Communication; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C73; D85. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6377 |
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