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| Ambec, Stefan; Langinier, Corinne; Lemarie, Stephane. |
| Inbred line seed producers face competition from their own consumers: farmers who save part of their harvest can costly self-produce. To reduce this competition, seed producers can switch to non-durable hybrid seed production. In a two-period model, we investigate what is the impact of crop durability on self-production, pricing strategies and switching decision. We first study the pricing decisions and switching decisions of an inbred line seed monopoly. Then, we analyze how the monopoly's behavior is affected by the entry of a hybrid seed producer. We also examine how the introduction of royalties on farmers who self-produce improves efficiency. Our main finding is that, for some constellation of costs, an inbred line seed monopoly has an incentive to... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19251 |
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| Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce the information gap, consumers can rely on standards (labels, certifications, geographic indications) that insure quality and origin of the goods. However, these standards do not always fully reveal information. Some of them may just signal that the good is more likely to be of high quality. We investigate what kind of standards are most desirable for producers, and for society in general knowing that any system is costly to implement. One of our findings is that for intermediate values of certification costs, certification that fully reveals information makes high quality producers better off, but make the entire industry worse off. In this case, the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality.; Consumer/Household Economics; L11; L15; D82; D71. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19510 |
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| Langinier, Corinne; Moschini, GianCarlo. |
| In this paper, we review the economic effects of intellectual property rights and specifically address the economics of the patent system. The production and dissemination of new knowledge is fraught with market failures because knowledge is a public good. Patents provide a second-best solution to the resulting appropriability problem. We review the main benefits and costs of the patent system, focusing on the role that patents play in providing incentives for innovation, in promoting the dissemination of knowledge, and in helping technology transfer and commercialization of new technology. From a more normative perspective, we address the questions of what the features of an optimal patent system are and whether the patent system is socially desirable. We... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18374 |
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| Langinier, Corinne. |
| In a model with two basic innovations that are fundamental to the development of an application, we investigate whether a patent pool can rectify the lack of incentives for developers to invest in applications when basic innovators themselves cannot develop follow-up applications. Furthermore, following Green and Scotchmer (1995), we investigate whether broad basic patents are necessary in order to provide enough incentives for basic innovators. We show that patent pools are more likely to be formed with patents of very different breadth, or with patents of similarly wide breadth. However, even though patent pools rectify the problem of developers' incentives, they may reduce the incentive for doing basic research.In a model with two basic innovations that... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21127 |
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| Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.. |
| Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce he information gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly standards can be adopted by a group of producers of high-quality goods. We study the formation of such a group that we model as a club. We first investigate under what circumstances a club of a given size is desirable for producers, and for society. We then analyze the optimal size of the club when there exists a direct barrier to entry, and when there is no barrier. We find that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size of certified producers have divergent incentives.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Asymmetric information; Certification; Clubs; Quality; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18606 |
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