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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Mason, Charles F. (2) Plantinga, Andrew J. (1) Palavra-chave D8 (2) L15 (2) Q2 (2) Additionality (1) Carbon Sequestration (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Incentive Contracting (1) Offsets (1) Petroleum Economics (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Stochastic Dynamic Optimization (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working Paper (1) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2011 (2) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Why do Firms Hold Oil Stockpiles? AgEcon Mason, Charles F.. Persistent and significant privately-held stockpiles of crude oil have long been an important empirical regularity in the United States. Such stockpiles would not rationally be held in a traditional Hotelling-style model. How then can the existence of these inventories be explained? In the presence of sufficiently stochastic prices, oil extracting firms have an incentive to hold inventories to smooth production over time. An alternative explanation is related to a speculative motive - firms hold stockpiles intending to cash in on periods of particularly high prices. I argue that empirical evidence supports the former but not the latter explanation. Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Petroleum Economics; Stochastic Dynamic Optimization; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q2; D8; L15. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120051 Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and Additionality AgEcon Mason, Charles F.; Plantinga, Andrew J.. Governments contracting with private agents for the provision of an impure public good must contend with agents who would potentially supply the good absent any payments. This additionality problem is centrally important in the use of carbon offsets as part of climate change mitigation. Analyzing optimal contracts for forest carbon sequestration, an important offset category, we conduct a national-scale simulation using results from an econometric model of land-use change. The results indicate that for an increase in forest area of 50 million acres, annual government expenditures with optimal contracts are about $4 billion lower compared than under a uniform subsidy. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Carbon Sequestration; Incentive Contracting; Offsets; Additionality; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q2; D8; L15. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101290 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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