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| Murphy, James J.; Dinar, Ariel; Howitt, Richard E.; Mastrangelo, Erin; Rassenti, Stephen J.; Smith, Vernon L.. |
| This research uses laboratory experiments to test alternative water market institutions designed to protect third-party interests. The institutions tested include taxing mechanisms that raise revenue to compensate affected third-parties, and a free market in which third-parties actively participate. We also discuss the likely implications of a command-and-control approach in which there are fixed limits on the volume of water that may be exported from a region. The results indicate that there are some important trade-offs in selecting a policy option. Although theoretically optimal, active third-party participation in the market is likely to result in free-riding that may erode some or all of the efficiency gains, and may introduce volatility into the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19812 |
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