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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) Autor Mauleon, Ana (4) Vannetelbosch, Vincent (4) Caulier, Jean-Francois (1) Grandjean, Gilles (1) Kirchsteiger, Georg (1) Mantovani, Marco (1) Vergote, Wouter (1) Mais... Palavra-chave A14 (2) C70 (2) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (2) Allocation Rules (1) Buyerseller Networks (1) C71 (1) C78 (1) C91 (1) C92 (1) Coalition Structures (1) Connections Model (1) Contractual Stability (1) D20 (1) D85 (1) Efficiency (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Experiment (1) Farsighted Players (1) Farsighted Stability (1) Matching Problem (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (4) Ano 2011 (1) 2009 (2) 2008 (1) País United States (4) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation AgEcon Mantovani, Marco; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these theories. Our results provide support for farsighted stability and strongly reject the idea of myopic behavior. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Experiment; Myopic and Farsighted Stability; Environmental Economics and Policy; D85; C91; C92. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108256 Connections Among Farsighted Agents AgEcon Grandjean, Gilles; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch’s (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Farsighted Players; Stability; Efficiency; Connections Model; Buyerseller Networks; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A14; C70; D20. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50482 Contractually Stable Networks AgEcon Caulier, Jean-Francois; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Networks; Coalition Structures; Contractual Stability; Allocation Rules; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; A14; C70. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52343 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching AgEcon Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Vergote, Wouter. We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Matching Problem; Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets; Farsighted Stability; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C71; C78. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6287 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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