|
|
|
|
|
| Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce L.; Maxwell, Brett J.. |
| Contract strategies can resolve some of the challenges that exist for property rights conformance of genetically modified (GM) crops. The purpose of this research is to determine how contract terms impact adoption decisions related to GM grain production and marketing. A simulation model was developed for prospective GM introduction in hard red spring (HRS) wheat, and distributions of net returns for growers were analyzed using stochastic dominance and stochastic efficiency. Results illustrate that contracts can be designed to induce desired behavior. Technology fees, probabilities of detection, and the level of non-GM premiums were the most notable factors influencing adoption decisions. In addition, point-of-delivery pricing and premiums for non-GM... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Adoption risk; GM crops; Incentives contracting; Stochastic dominance; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8593 |
| |
|
|
| Wilson, William W.; Maxwell, Brett J.; Dahl, Bruce L.. |
| Consistency of functional characteristics in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a concern confronting sellers and buyers. This research analyzes contract incentives for importers with respect to cost and potential risk of acceptance. A principal-agent framework is utilized to examine contract incentives. In the principal-agent contract, the principal offers the contract, the agent rejects or accepts the contract, and then decides how much effort to apply. All this is subject to risk for the agent and moral hazard for the principal. An example is presented, for which equilibrium contract terms are a base price of 454 cents per bushel for low quality wheat and a premium of 36 cents per bushel if high quality is achieved. The premium for high quality is... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Incentive Contact; Functional Characteristic; Wheat; Principal-Agent; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23559 |
| |
|
|
| Maxwell, Brett J.; Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce L.. |
| A number of challenges exist for genetically modified (GM) crop development at the production level. Contract strategies can resolve these challenges. Contracts can be designed to induce legal adoption of GM wheat by varying technology fees, violation detection, and penalties. The primary objective of this research is to analyze contracting strategies to determine terms to minimize technology agreement violation and to induce legal adoption of GM wheat. A simulation model of a crop budget for Hard Red Spring wheat was developed. Results illustrate that contracts can be designed to induce desired behavior. Technology fee, probability of detection, and the level of non-GM premium were the most notable factors influencing adoption decisions. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Producer Decisions; Risk; Genetically Modified; Contract Terms; Wheat; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23639 |
| |
|
|
| Wilson, William W.; Maxwell, Brett J.; Dahl, Bruce L.. |
| Consistency of functional characteristics in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a concern confronting sellers and buyers. This research analyzes contract incentives for importers with respect to cost and potential risk of acceptance. A principal-agent framework is utilized to examine contract incentives. In the principal-agent contract, the principal offers the contract, the agent rejects or accepts the contract, and then decides how much effort to apply. All this is subject to risk for the agent and moral hazard for the principal. An example is presented, for which equilibrium contract terms are a base price of 454 cents per bushel for low quality wheat and a premium of 36 cents per bushel if high quality is achieved. The premium for high quality is... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Incentive Contact; Functional Characteristic; Wheat; Principal-Agent; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23617 |
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
