|
|
|
|
|
| Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela. |
| We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching which is either a game solvable through iterated elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS), a pure Coordination game or a Coordination game with pareto ranked equilibria. We find strong evidence that participants do extrapolate between games. Playing a strategically different game hurts compared to the control treatment where no guessing game is played before and in fact impedes convergence to Nash equilibrium in both the 3x3 IEDS and the Coordination games. Playing... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Learning; Extrapolation; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C91. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98475 |
| |
|
|
| Kovarik, Jaromir; Mengel, Friederike; Romero, Jose Gabriel. |
| We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Networks; Coordination Problems; Experiments; Risk and Uncertainty; C72; C90; C91; D85. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61370 |
| |
|
|
| Fosco, Constanza; Mengel, Friederike. |
| We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic outcomes under a wide range of parameters. Depending on the parameters of the model two scenarios can arise. Either there is “full separation” of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is “marginalization” of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. Simulations confirm our analytical results and show that the share of cooperators increases with the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Game Theory; Cooperation; Imitation Learning; Network Formation; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C70; C73; D85. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50723 |
| |
|
|
|
