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| Registros recuperados: 37 | |
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| Michaelowa, Axel. |
| So far, the dominant paradigm in international climate policy has been mitigation while adaptation has been a low-key issue. However, with LDCs starting to push for adaptation side payments it has recently gained importance. The allocation of funds and the definition of adaptation activities are currently being discussed. The most outstanding difference between mitigation and adaptation is that mitigation activities contribute to a global public good whereas most forms of adaptation are club goods. Technical adapation such as building sea-walls can be distinguished from societal adaptation, e.g. different land-use patterns. Generally, there is a trade-off between mitigation and adaptation strategies as resources for climate policy are limited. The choice... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26401 |
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| Dutschke, Michael; Michaelowa, Axel. |
| International climate negotiations have specified that projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) should not lead to a "diversion" of official development assistance (ODA). It is however unchallenged that ODA can be used in capacity building for the CDM. Diversion can be interpreted in financial, sectoral and regional terms. There are possibilities to use ODA benchmarks to define diversion such as the UN 0.7% target but they are unlikely to be politically acceptable. On the project level, three main options exist but none of them is perfect. The value of emissions credits (CERs) could be deducted from ODA. This however leads to a long-term pressure on the ODA level. Differentiating an ODA-financed baseline project and a "piggyback" CDM option is... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International climate policy; CDM; Development assistance; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; O13. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26243 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel; Betz, Regina. |
| Currently, the EU-15 forms the only bubble under the Kyoto Protocol and has negotiated an internal burden sharing. A strategic EU climate policy should include accession countries. Thus, even in the case of early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, it would be sensible to form a bubble with all countries that are certain to be EU members during the commitment period 2008-2012. Of course due to Art. 4,4 of the Protocol the EU-15 has to stick to its own bubble. However, nothing prevents it from forming an implicit bubble including all first wave countries by inducing them to form a bubble on their own and transfer the surplus to the EU-15. Similarly, second wave countries should form a bubble of their own to co-ordinate JI and permit transfers to the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26397 |
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| Dutschke, Michael; Michaelowa, Axel; Stronzik, Marcus. |
| A whole bundle of so-called "flexible mechanisms" has been foreseen by the Kyoto Protocol in order to help industrial countries to fulfill their agreed reduction targets in the most cost-effective way. Emission permits will act as the backbone of all market-orientated mechanisms. Therefore, their initial allocation to the market participants is crucial. The deposit-refund model of Central Allocation is an alternative to the distribution of emission permits actually discussed in the context of flexible mechanisms. A Climate Bank is proposed that issues permits equal to the aggregate budget of all Annex-B countries. The system of Central Allocation is aimed to achieve an equitable distribution according to real emission needs, a positive sanction for... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26375 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel; Koch, Tobias. |
| Currently, international climate negotiations concentrate on design issues for the flexible instruments outlined in the Kyoto Protocol. As the 6th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change in late 2000 or early 2001 has to take decisions on these matters, it is imperative to develop solutions that combine long-term economic efficiency with long-term environmental effectiveness. Sometimes, a reconciliation of these targets is difficult and compromises have to be made. This report discusses solutions for three critical issues which have got different degrees of attention until now but are linked inasmuch their solution will be crucial for the success of the Kyoto Protocol. The authors have come across them due to their... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26061 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel. |
| German wind power development is a technological success story but has involved very high subsidies. Germany was a latecomer in wind power but specific political conditions in the late 1980s and early 1990s allowed the implementation of the feed in tariff regime which has characterised Germany ever since. The wind lobby managed to constitute itself at an early stage and to develop stable alliances with farmers and regional policymakers. The concentration of the wind industry in structurally weak regions reinforced these links. With an increased visibility of the subsidies and saturation of onshore sites in the early 2000s, the lobby has been less successful in retaining support. The current attempt to develop offshore projects may suffer from less... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Wind power; Interest groups; Technological change; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q420; Q580; Q520. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26349 |
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| Langrock, Thomas; Michaelowa, Axel; Greiner, Sandra. |
| The environmental integrity of the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol depends on the possibility to avoid giving emission credits to projects that would have happened anyway. Whether and how "Investment Additionality" of CDM projects has to be determined is currently part of climate negotiations. We discuss the rationale of companies to invest in projects and analyse possible criteria to determine Investment Additionality from a theoretical point of view. A number of case studies is used to show the implications of the different criteria. The use of a single criterion is not possible, especially due to the importance of non-monetary barriers. However, some criteria are better than others. Moreover, the institutional framework for the selection and application of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26282 |
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| Armenteros, Mercedes Fernandez; Michaelowa, Axel. |
| The countries wishing to join the EU have a high potential for low cost greenhouse gas emission reduction. As they cannot join the "bubble" agreement for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, project-based Joint Implementation (JI) could be a powerful strategy to integrate accession countries into an overall EU climate policy strategy. An important question in this context is whether the "acquis communautaire" will be used to define the baseline for the calculation of emission reductions from JI projects. A problem is that the grace periods for several environmental sectors, e.g. for application of the IPPC directive, differ considerably among countries. The EU should help accession countries to establish a predictable legal framework on which... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26370 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel; Schmitz, Simon. |
| The "first track" of Joint Implementation under the Kyoto Protocol gives host and investor countries total freedom in choosing a baseline for a project reducing or sequestering greenhouse gases. This is due to the fact that an overly generous granting of emission credits leads to a corresponding reduction of the host country's emission budget. Standardised, multi-project baselines can reduce transaction costs, especially in relatively homogeneous sectors such as electricity production or landfill methane collection. Host countries need capacity to calculate such baselines which currently does not exist. "Boundary organisations" can bridge the gap between technical analysis and strategic considerations. Interviews with government officials and other... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Joint Implementation; Baselines; Institutions; Host countries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; O13. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26173 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel; Jusen, Asuka; Krause, Karsten; Grimm, Bernhard; Koch, Tobias. |
| China has had an enormous growth of energy and electricity consumption during the last decades. This has been fuelled primarily by using domestic coal resources. Until 1997, annual construction of power stations averaged around 15 GW which was not sufficient to alleviate the demand surplus. Forecasts envisaged continuation of this growth. The majority of power stations is small scale and reather inefficient. Local air pollution is becoming very strong and is increasingly seen as a political issue. Foreign investment in the power sector has been hampered by bureaucracy and unclear competencies. On the demand side, energy efficiency has improved markedly in the last two decades, albeit from a very low basis. Due to the economic transformation, many proven... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26216 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel; Dutschke, Michael; Stronzik, Marcus. |
| The authors suggest a multi-layered system of three convergence criteria - similar to those used in the run-up to the European monetary union - that define the notion of "demonstrable progress" towards reaching the emission commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. These are the existence of an independently evaluated national emissions inventory, the level of domestic policies and measures, and the quantitative convergence of emissions towards the Kyoto target. While the first of these criteria constitutes a necessary condition for participation in the use of flexible instruments, the other two determine the degree of participation allowed for any given Annex I country. Wir schlagen - analog zur Bestimmung der Teilnehmer an der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26186 |
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| Rolfe, Chris; Michaelowa, Axel; Dutschke, Michael. |
| Das Kyoto-Protokoll zur UN-Klimarahmenkonvention setzt verbindliche Treibhausgasemissionsziele für Industrieländer, die allerdings erst im Zeitraum 2008-2012 gelten. Da für die Zeit bis 2008 mit einem erheblichen Emissionsanstieg zu rechnen ist, wird über Ansätze nachgedacht, schon vorher Anreize für Emissionsverringerungen zu setzen. Frühzeitige Emissionsverringerung reduziert das Risiko, klimatische Schwellenwerte zu überschreiten, die nichtlineare Veränderungen im Klimasystem auslösen. Außerdem wird der normale Investitionszyklus ausgenutzt, indem Neuinvestitionen emissionsärmer ausfallen. Dies verursacht keine oder nur geringe Kosten. Dazu bedarf es konkreter Anreize, die unterschiedlich ausfallen können. Während in Nordamerika eine freiwillige... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26049 |
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| Dutschke, Michael; Michaelowa, Axel. |
| Joint Implementation (JI) is a potentially powerful instrument of climate policy that could lead to a high amount of additional financial flows to developing countries. Nevertheless, many NGOs and developing country representatives are very skeptical about JI and fear that it would not take into account development priorities and create new kinds of dependence on industrial countries. Therefore, developing countries and industrial countries found a compromise at the Berlin Conference of the Parties as they instituted a pilot phase for JI lasting until 2000 which does not allow crediting of reduction achieved via JI. The paper discusses first results of the JI pilot phase in Costa Rica which could be important for the evaluation of the whole pilot phase.... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26337 |
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| Brauer, Wolfgang; Stronzik, Marcus; Michaelowa, Axel. |
| Zertifikatemärkte für grünen Strom (erneuerbare Energien) und CO2-Emissionen wurden bisher in der Literatur überwiegend isoliert betrachtet. Wir analysieren für den Elektrizitätssektor die Implikationen eines Zusammenwirkens (Koexistenz) beider Märkte. Es werden zwei Fälle der Koexistenz unterschieden. Bei geschlossener Koexistenz refinanziert sich ein grüner Stromproduzent ausschließlich über den grünen Zertifikatemarkt, während er bei offener Koexistenz auf beiden Märkten aktiv wird. Beide Situationen sind gegenüber dem Referenzfall als ineffizient zu bewerten. Während bei geschlossener Koexistenz insbesondere CO2-Verpflichtete einen Vorteil erlangen, profitieren bei offener Koexistenz die Verpflichteten für grünen Strom. Politischen Handlungsträgern... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26322 |
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| Zavyalova, Liliya; Michaelowa, Axel. |
| The Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol could create a great chance for developing countries to profit from projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve the economic and environmental situation in the host country. The project cycle for the CDM differs from a usual investment project due to the need to develop a baseline for the calculation of emission reductions, registration by a national CDM body and monitoring and verification of the emission reduction by an independent entity. Before a project can be registered, its eligibility has to be checked. This means that it has to fulfil the international and national CDM criteria. We suggest national criteria concerning the CDM component, adherence to national policy goals,... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26316 |
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| Dutschke, Michael; Michaelowa, Axel. |
| The implementation of activities aimed to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions is more cost-efficient in developing countries than in most of the industrialized world. A Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is to assure that the interests of all parties implicated in Joint Implementation between industrialized and developing countries be equally represented. This mechanism was decided upon on the Kyoto Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, but no provisions on the construction of the CDM were taken. The authors propose it to take the form of a clearinghouse and a project fund. In the light of game-theoretical analysis and practical experience collected during the pilot phase for Activities Implemented Jointly which... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26135 |
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| Bode, Sven; Michaelowa, Axel. |
| As part of the international climate negotiations there is a lot of discussion about methodologies for quantifying emission reductions of greenhouse gas reduction projects (baseline discussion) and about granting emission reduction credits only to projects that are additional (Investment Additionality discussion). So far this discussion has been fairly general and has not systematically analysed the impacts on investor decisions. We analyse these impacts for the case of renewable energies and show that the approaches under discussion can all give perverse incentives to invest at unfavourable sites. Thus, higher CO2 abatement costs than without any crediting system might be realised resulting in inefficiencies in climate policy. To overcome this problem we... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26197 |
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| Registros recuperados: 37 | |
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