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Towards a Theory of Policy Making AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S.; Salhofer, Klaus; Kola, Jukka.
The paper presents a theory of policy timing that relies on uncertainty and transaction costs to explain the optimal timing and length of policy reforms. Delaying reforms resolves some uncertainty by gaining valuable information and saves transaction costs. Implementing reforms without waiting increases welfare by adjusting domestic policies to changed market parameters. Optimal policy timing is found by balancing the trade-off between delaying reforms and implementing reforms without waiting. Our theory offers an explanation of why countries differ with respect to the length of their policy reforms, and why applied studies often judge agricultural policies to be inefficient.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Policy analysis; Uncertainty; Dynamic model; Transaction costs; Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114639
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GOVERNMENT VS. ANARCHY: MODELING THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S..
This paper gives a general mathematical definition of an institution, and presents an explicit formal method by which to incorporate institutions in a standard general equilibrium model. We illustrate our concept using a modified Prisoner's dilemma game in which property rights over natural resources emerge from an anarchy-like state of nature. Two players decide voluntarily and non-cooperatively whether to give up some fraction of their personal resource to set up an enforcement mechanism that punishes defecting players (i.e., players that do not opt to cooperate). This enforcement mechanism constitutes a credible threat, and is central to the establishment of bilateral cooperation (i.e, government). We highlight the importance of imperfect...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Institutions; Imperfect Information; Property Rights; Decision Making; Social Games; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C72; D7; D81.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21496
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The Economics of Delaying Policy Change: An Application to the 1992 CAP Reform AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S.; Salhofer, Klaus; Kola, Jukka.
Positive political economy is usually concerned with economic explanations of observed policy choices, while the timing of a policy reform has not gained similar attention. This is somewhat surprising since policy makers most often are free to decide both the design and timing of a policy reform. Drawing on insights from recent developments in the finance literature on investment under uncertainty, here we apply the idea of option value to the analysis of government policy making. Common political-economic explanations of the 1992 CAP reform are that policymakers felt domestic political pressure to make the CAP more efficient, and also international political pressure and to bring the CAP in line with treaty obligations. Although these arguments are sound,...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50957
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Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Examine U.S. and EU Agricultural Policy Institutions AgEcon
Bullock, David S.; Mittenzwei, Klaus.
A brief review of the history of agricultural policymaking in Europe and the U.S. reveals that major policy changes have often been brought about by major socio-political "shocks," such as the Great Depression and World War II. Such shocks also lead to the creation of institutions that tend to stay in place for long periods after the initial shock has passed. We use evolutionary game theory to model and simulate the effects of socio-political shocks on political institutions.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agricultural policy; Evolutionary game theory; Agricultural and Food Policy; Q18; D72; C73.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24538
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THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE POLICY PROCESS AgEcon
Bryden, John Marshall; Mittenzwei, Klaus.
B2_1
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Academic freedom; Policy process; Policy decision-making; Policy advice; Research; Research institute; Political Economy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93945
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Policy Design as an Irreversible Investment Under Uncertainty: Norwegian Agriculture and the WTO AgEcon
Mittenzwei, Klaus.
This paper is concerned with the timing of an agricultural policy reform under uncertainty. The focus is on the opportunity cost of giving up the option to wait when implementing a policy reform. Including the option value in applied policy analysis can help explain why conventional analyses may find observed policies to be Pareto-inferior. Furthermore, it explains why otherwise profitable policy reforms may be delayed. The theoretical model is applied to Norwegian agricultural policy anticipating a prospective WTO agreement. It is argued that the option value should be incorporated into applied policy analysis when high uncertainty prevails.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Option value; Policy reform; WTO; Norway; Uncertainty; International Relations/Trade; C61; D78.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24875
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