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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Montero, Maria (2) Palavra-chave C71 (1) C72 (1) C78 (1) EU Enlargement (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Financial Economics (1) Majoritarian Bargaining (1) Paradox of New Members (1) Power Measures (1) Weighted Voting (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2010 (1) 2006 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Inequity Aversion May Increase Inequity AgEcon Montero, Maria. Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required. This is due to the analogy between inequity aversion and risk aversion. Inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics: the advantage of being proposer can decrease as players become more impatient. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Financial Economics. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12166 The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis AgEcon Montero, Maria. Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of majoritarian bargaining and shows that the paradox is predicted in equilibrium for past EU enlargements. Furthermore, a majority of members would have been in favor of the 1981 enlargement even if members were bargaining over a fixed budget. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Majoritarian Bargaining; Weighted Voting; Power Measures; EU Enlargement; Paradox of New Members; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; C78. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96839 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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