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| Simtowe, Franklin; Zeller, Manfred; Phiri, Alexander. |
| Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain the success of Joint Liability Lending (JLL) schemes in mitigating moral hazard, empirical studies are rare. This paper investigates the determinants of moral hazard among JLL schemes from Malawi, using group level data from 99 farm and non-farm credit groups. Results reveal that peer selection, peer monitoring, peer pressure, dynamic incentives and variables capturing the extent of matching problems explain most of the variation in the incidence of moral hazard among credit groups. The implications are that Joint Liability Lending institutions will continue to rely on social cohesion and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Moral hazard; Joint liability; Dynamic incentives; Group lending; Malawi; Financial Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25287 |
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| Smale, Melinda; Phiri, Alexander. |
| This study records the use of hybrid maize seed and fertilizer by small-scale farmers in Malawi, as well as their opinions about these inputs, from 1989-90 through 1996-97. Its main purpose is to determine whether the principal constraint to smallholders use of maize hybrids is the acceptability of the hybrid maize germplasm or the institutional reforms and policies affecting its use. The study also provides information about a practice that has implications for the impact of seed technologies and seed industries the recycling of nonconventional hybrids (i.e., saving seed of an F1 hybrid to plant in subsequent seasons). Findings of the most recent farmer survey in 1996-97 demonstrate that the grain quality or yield characteristics of maize hybrids no... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7674 |
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