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Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 31
Pintassilgo, Pedro; Finus, Michael; Lindroos, Marko; Munro, Gordon R..
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should preferably be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. A comprehensive analysis of the economic and biological fundamentals that influence the success of coalition formation is provided. The results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher would be the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. It is also shown that the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6376
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International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help? 31
Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro.
Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce uncertainty about the environmental impact of emissions and the cost of reducing them, this conclusion is intriguing. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we analyze whether the result carries over to a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only no and full learning but also partial learning. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs instead of uncertainty about...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Transnational Cooperation; Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements; Uncertainty; Learning; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D62; D81; H41; Q20.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91655
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Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea – A Case of Trivial Cooperation 31
Kulmala, Soile; Levontin, Polina; Lindroos, Marko; Pintassilgo, Pedro.
This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four asymmetric players with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies. The results indicate that partial...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Atlantic salmon; Bioeconomic model; Coalition formation; Partition function; Sharing rules; Stability analysis; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59094
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