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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Rio, Patrick (3) Goodhue, Rachael E. (2) Morardet, Sylvie (2) Rausser, Gordon C. (2) Simon, Leo K. (2) Thoyer, Sophie (2) Ali, Murad (1) Le Grusse, P. (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Ambient tax (1) Bargaining (1) C78 (1) D78 (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Negotiations (1) Nonpoint source pollution (1) Q25 (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Tradable permits market (1) Water (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Book (1) Ano 2008 (1) 2007 (1) 2003 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Tradable Permits Under Threat to Manage Nonpoint Source Pollution AgEcon Ali, Murad; Le Grusse, P.; Rio, Patrick. In this article we treat the problem of nonpoint source pollution as a problem of moral hazard in group. To solve this kind of problem we consider a group performance based tax coupled to tradable permits market. The tax is activated if the group fails to meet the ambient standard. So the role of the tax is to provide an incitation to ensure that the agents provide the abatement level necessary to achieve the standard. The role of the tradable permits market is to distribute effectively this abatement level through the price of the permits which rises with the exchange of the permits. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Nonpoint source pollution; Ambient tax; Tradable permits market; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44414 Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations: Application to water management policies in France AgEcon Simon, Leo K.; Thoyer, Sophie; Morardet, Sylvie; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rio, Patrick; Rausser, Gordon C.. Environmental policies are characterized by a growing emphasis on participation, devolution and negotiated decision making. Increasingly, centralized top down decision making systems are being replaced by new forms of local governance. In their strongest versions, these involve delegation of formal authority to local stakeholders who are expected to decide collectively upon the management rules of local common-pool resources. Devolution is particularly important in relation to the allocation and management of scarce water resources. Indeed the French water law of 1992 institutionalised the notion of devolution by requiring that water management rules be negotiated at the river basin level between all stakeholders. Although stakeholder negotiation is... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C78; Q25; D78. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58258 Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy AgEcon Simon, Leo K.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rausser, Gordon C.; Thoyer, Sophie; Morardet, Sylvie; Rio, Patrick. Stakeholder negotiation is an increasingly important policymaking tool. However, relatively little is understood about the relationship between the structure of the negotiating process and the effectiveness with which stakeholders can pursue their individual interests. We apply the Rausser- Simon multilateral bargaining model to a specific negotiation process involving water storage capacity and use in the upper Adour Basin in southwestern France. We focus on a coalition of three stakeholder groups with aligned but distinct interests. In addition to the standard indices of bargaining power—the distribution of political weights (“access”) and players’ utilities if an agreement is not reached, our analysis identifies other less obvious sources of power.... Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: Water; Bargaining; Negotiations; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37630 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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