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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (7) Autor Rubbelke, Dirk T.G. (7) Mukherjee, Vivekananda (2) Dijkstra, Bouwe R. (1) Finus, Michael (1) Markandya, Anil (1) Rive, Nathan (1) Sanyal, Tilak (1) Weiss, Pia (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (5) Q54 (5) Impure Public Goods (3) Ancillary Benefits (2) Climate Policy (2) H87 (2) Q58 (2) Abatement Technology (1) Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy (1) C72 (1) CDM (1) Coalition Formation (1) Conditional Transfers (1) Environmental Policy (1) F18 (1) F35 (1) Food Security and Poverty (1) GHG Emissions (1) Game Theory (1) H23 (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (7) Ano 2011 (1) 2008 (4) 2007 (1) 2006 (1) País United States (7) Idioma Inglês (7)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 7 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Impure Public Technologies and Environmental Policy AgEcon Markandya, Anil; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. Analyses of public goods regularly address the case of pure public goods. However, a large number of (international) public goods exhibit characteristics of different degrees of publicness, i.e. they are impure public goods. In our analysis of transfers helping to overcome the inefficient provision of such goods, we therefore apply the Lancastrian characteristics approach. In contrast to the existing literature, we consider the case of a continuum of impure public goods. We employ the example of international conditional transfers targeting to overcome suboptimal low climate protection efforts by influencing the abatement technology choice of countries. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Impure Public Goods; Lancastrian Characteristics Approach; Conditional Transfers; Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H87; Q54. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44226 Environmental Regulations, Market Structure and Technological Progress in Renewable Energy Technology — A Panel Data Study on Wind Turbines AgEcon Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.; Weiss, Pia. We study the impact of environmental regulations on the patent activities for wind turbines between 1980 and 2008. We explicitly control for energy market liberalisation and take a potential interaction between liberalisation and policy instruments into account. We find a strong and highly significant effect of environmental tax revenues, which we regard as a proxy for the extent to which energy prices changed in favour of renewable energies, as well as foreign demand for wind turbines on innovation activities. In addition, we find that price-based policy instruments are more effective in fostering innovations in the wind turbine technology when energy markets are fully open to competition. In contrast, non-price-based policy instruments such as grants or... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Policy; Renewable Energy; Market Structure; Wind Turbines; Innovation; Patents; Technological Change; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q55; Q58; O34; O38. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102569 Global Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Trade with Complete Specialization AgEcon Mukherjee, Vivekananda; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. The paper develops a model in which a country with better technology for abatement of Green House Gas (GHG) emission (the North) commits to an international protocol to keep the global GHG emission within a specified limit while it helps the mitigation effort in the other country (the South) with unconditional transfer of abatement technology. It finds out in the autarkic (‘no trade’) equilibrium the technology transfer offer from the North is always accepted by the South. The North may offer either a partial or a complete technology transfer. If partial technology transfer is offered it finds out the determinants of the extent of technology transfer. Then it compares the autarkic equilibrium with equilibrium where trade with complete specialization occurs... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12060 Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate Protection AgEcon Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.; Rive, Nathan. In an impure public good model we analyze the effects of CDM transfers on poverty as well as on the global climate protection level. We construct an analytical model of a developing and an industrialized region, both of which independently seek to maximize their utility – a function of private consumption, domestic air quality, and global climate protection. They do so by distributing their finite expenditures across (1) the aggregate consumption good, (2) end-of-pipe pollution control technologies, and (3) greenhouse gas abatement. Based on our analytical findings, we develop two sets of simulations for China in which we vary the rate of the CDM transfer. The simulations differ by the assumption of China’s domestic air quality policy – the first assumes a... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; CDM; Climate Policy; Impure Public Goods; Transfers; Abatement Technology; Environmental Economics and Policy; Food Security and Poverty; Q54; H23; H41; O33. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46650 Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy AgEcon Finus, Michael; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; Climate Policy; Coalition Formation; Game Theory; Impure Public Goods; C72; H87; Q54. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42902 Technology Transfer in the Non-traded Sector as a Means to Combat Global Warming AgEcon Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.; Mukherjee, Vivekananda; Sanyal, Tilak. The paper considers a situation where two countries – the North and the South – use a non-traded polluting input to produce the goods for final consumption. The North is more efficient in both, production and abatement processes. The study compares the effects of the transfer of abatement technology by the North to the South under autarky with the free trade situation, assuming that the North pre-commits to an international protocol to keep the global pollution under a fixed level. The conditions under which either full or partial technology is transferred in autarky are determined. It is shown that under free trade no such transfer is possible. With trade even though the North wants a complete transfer of technology, the South refuses it. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: GHG Emissions; Mitigation; Technology Transfer; International Trade; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; F18; F35; Q54; Q56. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44228 Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy AgEcon Dijkstra, Bouwe R.; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. We examine an incentive scheme for a group of agents, where all agents are rewarded if the group meets its target. If the group does not meet its target, only the agents that meet their individual target are rewarded. In environmental policy, the EU burden sharing agreement and the UK Climate Change Agreements feature this incentive scheme. There is only a difference in outcome between group and individual rewards if emissions are stochastic. Group rewards generally lead to higher expected emissions than individual rewards. The attraction of the group reward scheme may lie in its fairness and its tough-looking targets. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Team Incentive Scheme; Stochastic Pollution; UK Climate Change Agreements; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q58. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9333 Registros recuperados: 7 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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