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| Bullock, David S.; Rutstrom, Elisabet E.. |
| We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy in which the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and in which over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers. We observe behavior that deviates from dominant strategies. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20447 |
