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Dynamics and Limited Cooperation In International Environmental Agreements AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Sacheti, Sandeep.
The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be modified for certain types of pollution problems. For local pollution problems, a sufficient level of free-riding actually promotes signatories' welfare. For global pollution problems, the conventional wisdom is correct insofar as free-riding makes it more difficult to form a successful IEA. However, for some global pollution problems, free-riding may disappear. A static model may overstate or understate the difficulty of forming a successful IEA. The effect of an IEA...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreements; Environmental stocks; Dynamics; Free-riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; F12; F42; Q28.
Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6212
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Common Ground Between Free-Traders and Environmentalists AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Sacheti, Sandeep; Zhao, Jinhua.
We use a North-South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto-dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is quite resilient. Trade may cause an environmentally poor country to drag down" its richer trading partner; in this case, both countries degrade their stocks when these would be preserved under autarky. Alternatively, trade may enable the environmentally richer country to pull up" its partner; in this case both countries preserve their stocks when these would be degraded under autarky. These results rationalize the positions of environmentalists and free-traders. The...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; D5; F1; O2; Q2.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25042
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Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Sacheti, Sandeep.
Governments' desire to ameliorate environmental problems may conflict with other goals. Policy levels which balance different objectives can be altered by policy changes in other countries. A decrease in the importance of the pollution problem, or an increase in its global extent, increase the likelihood that tighter environmental regulations in one region induce laxer policies elsewhere. The transboundary character and the importance of environmental externalities also affect the amount of cooperation needed to improve members' welfare in a coalition. More global pollution problems require a larger coalition. However, the critical coalition size may be larger or smaller for more severe problems.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental policy; Limited cooperation; International environmental agreements; Strategic complements and substitution; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; F02; F13; H21; L13; Q28.
Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6286
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The Long-Run Effects of Environmental Reform in Open Economies AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Zhao, Jinhua; Sacheti, Sandeep.
We compare the short-run and long-run effects of environmental reform and harmonization under autarky and free trade. When trade is driven by environmental distortions rather than real relative advantages, harmonization of environmental policies, even if achieved by lowering standards in one country, can improve short-run aggregate welfare. With the possibility of multiple steady states, long-run considerations favor a "race to the top" rather than a "race to the bottom" even when upward and downward harmonizations are equivalent in the short run. For a country trapped in a low (or bad) steady state, environmental reform may not move it to a high (or good) steady state under autarky. However, under trade, harmonization of policies may enable this country...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International trade and the environment; Environmental policy reform; International harmonization of environmental policies; Environmental dynamics and trade; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; Q20; F10; H23.
Ano: 2000 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25099
Registros recuperados: 4
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