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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Beard, Rodney (2) Salerno, Gillian (2) Mallawaarachchi, Thilak (1) McDonald, Stuart (1) Palavra-chave Agricultural extension (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Game theory (1) Imperfect private monitoring (1) Imperfect public monitoring (1) Non-point source pollution (1) Public choice (1) Public education (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Ano 2007 (2) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última The political economy of shallow lakes AgEcon Salerno, Gillian; McDonald, Stuart; Beard, Rodney. Shallow lakes display hysteresis in their response to phosphorous loading. Gradual increases in the nutrient content of the lake can appear to have little effect on the oligotrophic state of the lake until a point at which the lake suddenly flips to a eutrophic state. Ecotaxes on phosphorous loading have been suggested as means to maintain the lake in the socially desirable state - oligotrophic or not - when society can agree on a common welfare function. In this paper, we consider the case where society is divided into two interest groups and is thus unable to agree. In particular, the communities that share the use of the lake disagree on the relative importance of the shallow lake acting as a waste sink for phosphorous run-off as opposed to other... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10385 Environmental lobbying with imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality AgEcon Beard, Rodney; Mallawaarachchi, Thilak; Salerno, Gillian. In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm extension programmes highlighted. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Game theory; Public choice; Imperfect public monitoring; Imperfect private monitoring; Non-point source pollution; Agricultural extension; Public education; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10391 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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