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| Sheriff, Glenn; Osgood, Daniel E.. |
| Recent outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever in sheep have led to boycotts of African livestock by Middle Eastern importers. To normalize trade, attempts have been made to apply new livestock forecasting and monitoring technologies. In this process, producers have exhibited a resistance in revealing livestock health information, a resistance that could jeopardize the information system and lead to further boycotts. We investigate the incentives governing this problem and model the most fundamental contract issues, those concerning reputation and credibility. Equilibrium contracts require that the buyer compensate the producer for private information to address the shepherd's dilemma of concealing livestock information (and facing continued boycotts) or revealing... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19340 |
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| Athanassoglou, Stergios; Sheriff, Glenn; Siegfried, Tobias; Tim Huh, Woonghee. |
| Standard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we derive regulatory mechanisms for inducing the socially optimal extraction path in Markov perfect equilibrium for aquifers in which these assumptions do not hold. In spite of the complexity of the underlying system, we identify an interesting case in which a simple linear mechanism achieves the social optimum. To illustrate potential problems that can arise by erroneously imposing simplifying assumptions, we conduct a simulation based on data from the Indian state of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Common Property Resource; Differential Games; Groundwater Extraction; Imperfect Monitoring; Markov Perfect Equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy; C6; D0. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102502 |
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| Sheriff, Glenn. |
| Mechanism design models typically conclude by characterizing an optimal allocation schedule based on the principal's beliefs regarding agent value functions and the distribution of agent types. This article addresses the question of how a principal can develop these beliefs given a standard cross-sectional data set in which agents' input-output choices are observable, but their underlying heterogeneity is not. I employ the methodology to evaluate strategies for reducing the cost of a voluntary program that reduces cultivation on environmentally-sensitive farmland. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21420 |
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