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| Murphy, James J.; Dinar, Ariel; Howitt, Richard E.; Mastrangelo, Erin; Rassenti, Stephen J.; Smith, Vernon L.. |
| This research uses laboratory experiments to test alternative water market institutions designed to protect third-party interests. The institutions tested include taxing mechanisms that raise revenue to compensate affected third-parties, and a free market in which third-parties actively participate. We also discuss the likely implications of a command-and-control approach in which there are fixed limits on the volume of water that may be exported from a region. The results indicate that there are some important trade-offs in selecting a policy option. Although theoretically optimal, active third-party participation in the market is likely to result in free-riding that may erode some or all of the efficiency gains, and may introduce volatility into the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19812 |
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| Murphy, James J.; Dinar, Ariel; Howitt, Richard E.; Rassenti, Stephen J.; Smith, Vernon L.; Weinberg, Marca. |
| We use laboratory experiments to test three different water market institutions designed to incorporate instream flow values into the allocation. The institutions are (1) a baseline with fixed minimum flow constraints, (2) an environmental agent contributing to the cost of providing instream flows, and (3) creating an instream flow right in which an environmental agent can sell the right to reduced flows. Using a "smart" computer-coordinated market, we find that direct environmental participation in the market can achieve highly efficient and stable allocations. A particularly attractive and practical feature of the third institution is that it nests the status quo in the sense that, should the environmental agent choose not to participate in the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14525 |
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