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| Spraggon, John M.. |
| This paper tests the ability of an exogenous targeting instrument to induce compliance when the principal cannot observe the actions of individual agents. A number of papers show that although these instruments are able to induce groups to the target outcome, they are not able to induce individuals to make socially optimal decisions in a number of different controlled laboratory experiments. This study investigates whether the information individuals have about others’ payoffs affects how they make their decisions in this environment. Ledyard (1995) suggests that when subjects have less information in public goods experiments they are more likely to choose the Nash equilibrium decision. However, as he points out, this effect differs between groups with... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Moral Hazard in Groups; Exogenous Targeting Instruments; Experiments; Information; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C92; D70. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7383 |
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| Spraggon, John M.; Oxoby, Robert J.. |
| We explore the effects of recommended play and the presentation of payoff information on behavior in an ambient-based policy instrument experiment. Specifically, we test the effects of recommended play (via a description of marginal decision making) and a payoff table on the behavior of individuals facing an ambient-based policy instrument. We find that recommended play and the presentation of a payoff table increases the use of the socially optimal strategy, thereby increasing efficiency. These results suggest that providing decision makers with a richer description of the decision making environment significantly reduces decision error, significantly improving the efficiency of ambient-based policy instruments. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Ambient pollution instruments; Recommended play; Experiments; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90832 |
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| Suter, Jordan F.; Spraggon, John M.; Poe, Gregory L.. |
| Water quality trading schemes in the United States can predominantly be characterized by low trading volumes. In this paper we utilize laboratory economics experiments to explore the extent to which the technology through which pollution abatement is achieved influences market outcomes. Mirroring the majority of water quality trading markets, the sessions utilize small trading groups composed of six participants. To understand the extent to which abatement technology influences trading behavior, the experimental treatments vary the degree of heterogeneity in initial abatement costs and the potential for long-lived investments in cost-reducing abatement technology. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/104023 |
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