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| Registros recuperados: 31 | |
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| Murphy, James J.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| This paper uses laboratory experiments to test individual responses to policies that seek to encourage firms to voluntarily discover and disclose violations of environmental standards. We find that while it is possible to motivate a significant number of voluntary disclosures without adversely affecting environmental quality, this result is sensitive to both the fine for disclosed violations and the assumption that firms know their compliance status without cost. When firms have to expend resources to determine their compliance status, motivating a significant number of violation disclosures yields worse environmental quality. Finally, relative to conventional enforcement, disclosure polices will result in more violations being sanctioned, but fewer of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14519 |
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| Stranlund, John K.. |
| This paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target? The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Under common assumptions, I show that allowing noncompliance is cost-effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty. However, one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target at lower... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14520 |
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| Murphy, James J.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the theoretical observations that both the violations of competitive risk-neutral firms and the marginal effectiveness of increased enforcement across firms are independent of differences in their abatement costs and their initial allocations of permits. This conclusion has important implications for enforcing emissions trading programs because it suggests that regulators have no justification for targeting their enforcement effort based on firm-level characteristics. Consistent with the theory, we find that subjects' violations were independent of parametric differences in their abatement costs. However, those subjects that were predicted to buy permits tended to have higher violation levels than those who... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14513 |
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| Stranlund, John K.. |
| Most of the theoretical literature on enforcing environmental policies focuses on situations in which pollution sources are noncompliant. However, some recent work suggests that these situations will very often involve suboptimal policy designs. Thus, the circumstances under which it is efficient to implement policies that do not motivate full compliance appear to be more limited than most of the literature would imply. In this paper, I identify several circumstances under which regulators may conserve enforcement costs by implementing emissions taxes that firms evade. I demonstrate that a regulator can use a firm’s tax evasion to reduce monitoring effort, but only if its monitoring strategy can be made an increasing function of the firm’s emissions, if... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Sanctions; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93967 |
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| Velez, Maria Alejandra; Murphy, James J.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| This paper uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Each group of five subjects played 10 rounds of an open access common pool resource game, and 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions communication alone, two external regulations that differed by the level of enforcement, and communication combined with each of the two regulations. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of a complementary relationship between communication and external regulation is supported for some combinations of regions and regulations, but... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Development; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14532 |
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| Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.; Villena, Mauricio G.. |
| We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Compliance; Enforcement; Emissions Taxes; Monitoring; Asymmetric Information; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7387 |
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| McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Voluntary agreements; Self-enforcing agreements; Emissions tax; Enforcement; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7382 |
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| McEvoy, David M.; Stranlund, John K.. |
| Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance. In this paper we analyze a static IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties' compliance to the terms of an IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21403 |
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| Stranlund, John K.. |
| This paper characterizes optimal noncompliance for an emissions trading policy that seeks to achieve a given aggregate emissions target at least cost. The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Optimal noncompliance depends in large measure on whether the marginal penalty for individual violations is increasing or constant. The primary result of this work is that any policy that achieves an aggregate emissions target with a linearly increasing marginal penalty, regardless of whether it involves perfect or imperfect compliance, is more costly than an alternative policy that induces perfect compliance with a constant marginal penalty. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14508 |
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| Stranlund, John K.; Zhang, Wei. |
| We study the impact of bankruptcy risk on markets for tradable environmental and natural resource permits. We find that firms that risk bankruptcy demand more permits than if they were financially secure. Consequently, bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for tradable property rights causes an inefficient distribution of individual choices among regulated firms. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits is not independent of the initial distribution of permits. In fact, the inefficiency that is associated with bankruptcy risk is mitigated if financially insecure firms are given a larger share of the initial allocation of permits. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bankruptcy; Tradable permits; Permit markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q28; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7384 |
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| Stranlund, John K.; Chavez, Carlos A.. |
| In this paper we examine the impacts of transaction costs on enforcing a transferable emissions permit system. We derive an enforcement strategy with a self-reporting requirement that achieves complete compliance in a cost-effective manner. In the absence of transaction costs targeted enforcement-the practice of monitoring some firms more closely than others-is neither necessary nor desirable. In the presence of constant marginal transaction costs, buyers of permits should be monitored more closely than sellers, but within groups of buyers and sellers monitoring should be uniform. When marginal transaction costs are not constant, effective monitoring will depend on whether a firm is a buyer or seller, its demand for permits relative to its initial... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14527 |
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| Registros recuperados: 31 | |
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