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| Dutschke, Michael; Michaelowa, Axel; Stronzik, Marcus. |
| A whole bundle of so-called "flexible mechanisms" has been foreseen by the Kyoto Protocol in order to help industrial countries to fulfill their agreed reduction targets in the most cost-effective way. Emission permits will act as the backbone of all market-orientated mechanisms. Therefore, their initial allocation to the market participants is crucial. The deposit-refund model of Central Allocation is an alternative to the distribution of emission permits actually discussed in the context of flexible mechanisms. A Climate Bank is proposed that issues permits equal to the aggregate budget of all Annex-B countries. The system of Central Allocation is aimed to achieve an equitable distribution according to real emission needs, a positive sanction for... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26375 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel; Dutschke, Michael; Stronzik, Marcus. |
| The authors suggest a multi-layered system of three convergence criteria - similar to those used in the run-up to the European monetary union - that define the notion of "demonstrable progress" towards reaching the emission commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. These are the existence of an independently evaluated national emissions inventory, the level of domestic policies and measures, and the quantitative convergence of emissions towards the Kyoto target. While the first of these criteria constitutes a necessary condition for participation in the use of flexible instruments, the other two determine the degree of participation allowed for any given Annex I country. Wir schlagen - analog zur Bestimmung der Teilnehmer an der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26186 |
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| Brauer, Wolfgang; Stronzik, Marcus; Michaelowa, Axel. |
| Zertifikatemärkte für grünen Strom (erneuerbare Energien) und CO2-Emissionen wurden bisher in der Literatur überwiegend isoliert betrachtet. Wir analysieren für den Elektrizitätssektor die Implikationen eines Zusammenwirkens (Koexistenz) beider Märkte. Es werden zwei Fälle der Koexistenz unterschieden. Bei geschlossener Koexistenz refinanziert sich ein grüner Stromproduzent ausschließlich über den grünen Zertifikatemarkt, während er bei offener Koexistenz auf beiden Märkten aktiv wird. Beide Situationen sind gegenüber dem Referenzfall als ineffizient zu bewerten. Während bei geschlossener Koexistenz insbesondere CO2-Verpflichtete einen Vorteil erlangen, profitieren bei offener Koexistenz die Verpflichteten für grünen Strom. Politischen Handlungsträgern... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26322 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel; Stronzik, Marcus. |
| The Kyoto Protocol sets legally binding emission targets for industrialized countries without accounting for reductions carried out prior to 2008, the beginning of the first commitment period. There exists only one exception, the project-based Clean Development Mechanism. Two other possible ways to allow crediting for early reductions are discussed in this paper, a domestic scheme and early Joint Implementation. The implications of these concepts are analyzed on a macro as well as on a micro level taking the domestic and international commitments into account. They can lead to a strong redistribution and are prone to free riding. We conclude that early crediting makes built on clear baselines, sets incentives for innovation and provides for institutional... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26345 |
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| Michaelowa, Axel; Stronzik, Marcus. |
| Transaction costs will reduce the attractiveness of the Kyoto Mechanisms compared to domestic abatement options. Especially the project-based mechanisms CDM and JI are likely to entail considerable costs of baseline development, verification and certification. The AIJ pilot phase and the PCF programme give indications about the level of these costs. Under current estimates of world market prices for greenhouse gas emission permits, projects with annual emission reductions of less than 50,000 t CO2 equivalent are unlikely to be viable; for micro projects transaction costs can reach several hundred per t CO2 equivalent. Thus the Marrakesh Accord rule to have special rules for small scale CDM projects makes sense, even if the thresholds chosen advantage... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26284 |
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