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A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games AgEcon
Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko.
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12168
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Computational Complexity in Additive Hedonic Games AgEcon
Sung, Shao Chin; Dimitrov, Dinko.
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Additive Preferences; Coalition Formation; Computational Complexity; Hedonic Games; NP-hard; NP-complete; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C63; C70; C71; D02; D70; D71.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46655
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